

The positive impact of migrants in the sphere of society

A report on desk research
done by the MAX project





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Acknowledgment

This document is funded under the AMIF project MAX, Grant Agreement 821672

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


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I. Introduction

THE UN DESA International Migration 2019 report estimates a global figure of 272 million migrants in 2019, a 51 million increase since 2010. International migrants now comprise 3.5 per cent of the global population, compared to 2.8 per cent in 2000. Europe hosted the largest number of international migrants (82 million) in 2019, followed by Northern America (59 million) and Northern Africa and Western Asia (49 million) (UNDESA 2019).



Migration has long played a central role in Europe's past. The free movement of labour is a central assumption of today's EU, but was preceded by centuries of migration as people responded to changes in their environment, technology and security. Like today, Europe has always felt the impact of migrant populations. Migration is usually often associated with change in a society (Castles 2010) and so needs to be understood as integral to broader debates concerning Europe's society. So just as there is no singular theory of European or societal integration, there is no simple theory of integration that applies to migration. Debates over migration therefore present opportunities for discussing the societies we live in and how we want them to be.

In the following sections we will discuss how migrants have come to be located at the boundaries of a wide range of contemporary debates identified in the country reports. The thematic organisation of this report highlights how migration is taking place at a time of significant change in Europe. Europe is ageing, facing new security and environmental threats and suffering the departure of a long-standing partner. During periods of great uncertainty, when traditional institutions seem strained, debates over migration may be infused with a need for countries to

define themselves against “the other” (Said 1978). In a similar way, the EU’s migration policy also describes Europe’s ongoing renegotiation of past and present, through the links between migration, colonialism and regional conflict.

Political debates over the acceptable limits in a society are increasingly regulated through the delineation of migrants as different, unintegrated, criminal and even security threats (Schrover & Schinkel 2013). This is in part because national boundaries have become less defined by border guards than by employers checking work visas, welfare officers checking eligibility criteria, and estate agents checking mortgage credit scores. Cynical politicians have also sought to placate societies fearful of change by reinforcing traditional ideas of who deserves welfare or work. In these reports we see that migrants have been inaccurately presented as a drain on scarce resources (when they contribute more in tax), carriers of infectious disease (when they arrive healthy) or as occupying local housing deserved by nationals. Even though we see the central role migrants play in helping societies to change, we also see they are forced to integrate into unclear social norms and to lose their identities rather than enrich that society with their own.

Many of the negative contemporary debates concerning the role of migrants in Europe are therefore a product of a lack of security in how European society see itself in the world. How will Europe’s ageing population care, feed, or pay for itself when its demography becomes too old to sustain itself? How can the European economy create wealth when it has low growth and tight monetary policy and centralised banking interventions fail to kick start the economy? How can Europe act alone if it wants to address the mass extinctions and climate change that threaten human life on earth? Finally, how secure is Europe’s greatest gift to the world – democracy and the rule of law – when member state electorates increasingly return far right even fascist politicians to parliament and power?

Yet migrants and migration offer real solutions to many of these challenges. We see that they dominate in providing care, create jobs in new businesses, innovate in new areas (especially services) and play a vital role in the reproduction of society. Migration is as integrally linked to climate change as it is to the flight from conflict and in both contexts, offer real mechanisms for effective solutions to global and collective challenges. Yet in one particular area – the political - migration has consistently been let down by a lack of voice, misrepresentation and dehumanisation. That this is possible in C21st indicate a need to rethink the role of migrants and citizenship in a global age.

The following sections draw on a wide range of information derived from country reports written by NGOs who support and lobby on behalf of migrants across the EU. These have been supplemented by data and academic literature to interrogate the assertions of the reports, and contextualise them in relation to broader themes. The report on society argues that migration offers a huge opportunity for renewing Europe but requires a new set of political rights to ensure that the benefits of migration are recognised, realised and rewarded.

II. Migrant flows and the EU Member States


Migration flows across the EU have in recent years accompanied periods of dramatic change. The end of the Cold War led to the enlargement of the EU which welcomed new member states and EU citizens entitled to travel across the EU for work, pleasure and love. The 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre led to a new war on global terror that redefined debates concerning global security and presented a new challenge of global terrorism, felt in many of the major cities of the EU. The global financial crash and the policies of economic austerity that accompanied them, dramatically reduced the capacity of welfare states to deliver services to all citizens, including migrants.

Regional destabilisation such as the war in Syria and the Arab Spring have also generated new flows of migration as people fled violence. Nearly 44,000 asylum requests were lodged in the Netherlands alone in 2015. Syrians formed the largest group in Holland, with roughly 18,700 claims, followed by 7,400 Eritreans claims. Asylum claims dropped to 19,370 in 2016 and 16,145 in 2017 before rising again slightly in 2018 to 20,510. Although asylum applications declined from the 2015 high, the number of family members of asylum seekers arriving within three months after the application has been trending up. In 2015, 13,800 family members arrived, which dipped to 11,815 in 2016 before rising again to 14,990 in 2017, followed by a marked drop to 6,465 in 2018. Since 2016, Dutch authorities have started very strictly applying evidentiary rules regarding family relationships which has challenged asylum seekers, particularly Eritreans, for whom access to documents can be very difficult. The Dutch Refugee Council (Vluchtelingenwerk), argue that the application of the rules is not in line with the EU directive on family reunification, which states that an application for family reunification cannot be denied solely on the basis of insufficient documentation.

In addition to these high profile events, other structural changes have altered the context of migration to create a new politics of mobility (Sheller & Urry 2006). Cheap universally available communication technologies have opened the eyes of the world to the opportunities of Europe. It has also altered the distribution of wealth, working conditions and pay and opportunities. Just as the Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act presented modern, continental scale response to the outdated nationally defined economic orders of the C19th, so the borders around the EU designed to keep out “economic” migrants appear anachronistic to the universal principles of the EU. Europe’s disproportionate appeal is also notable. While the logic for migration is often assumed to be economic – a rational response to the opportunities offered by Europe’s markets and welfare - clearly there is not a free market in migration. Colonialism, religion, culture and language also channel migration flows.

When it comes to the need for practical responses to the challenges of climate change, the boundaries between Europe and the rest of the world seem even more arbitrary. As the first industrial continent, Europe has made a significant contribution to the carbon content in the world’s atmosphere. While EU wide rules, and a shift towards services, has reduced the EU’s current emissions, its demand for consumer goods redistributes pollution to manufacturing nations in the south. Meanwhile the impact of past emissions has contributed to catastrophic climate events around the globe. In this sense, the drought, famine and disease that have propelled migration away from traditional homelands towards Europe, are the product of Europe’s past decisions (Beck 1992).

Countries in Europe therefore attract and retain high levels of migration not because of demand and supply but because of a wide range of drivers. Migration and migrants sit at the intersection of a wide range of issues including globalisation and social transformation; inequality, security, technology, labour demand, demographic changes, politics and populism, laws and rights, social dynamics of migration and ‘the migration industry’ (Castles 2013: 124). It is no surprise that the country reports therefore reveal marked differences in migration patterns and issues. The report beneath therefore begins by exploring broad patterns and themes highlighted in the country reports, before addressing the politics of definitional issues. These are followed by an illustration of the effect populism can have even in the cosmopolitan political environment of the Netherlands before exploring specific issues such as welfare, healthcare housing and the relatively new trend of criminalising migration.



III. Patterns of migration in the EU and its members states

EUROSTAT: Germany reported the largest total number of immigrants (917.1 thousand) in 2017, followed by the United Kingdom (644.2 thousand), Spain (532.1 thousand), France (370.0 thousand) and Italy (343.4 thousand). Germany also reported the highest number of emigrants in 2017 (560.7 thousand), followed by Spain (368.9 thousand), the United Kingdom (359.7 thousand), France (312.6 thousand), Romania (242.2 thousand) and Poland (218.5 thousand). A total of 22 of the EU Member States reported more immigration than emigration in 2017, but in Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania the number of emigrants outnumbered the number of immigrants (EUROSTAT 2019).

For the purpose of this study we have collected information on migrant integration on a country by country basis from national partners. In addition to the practical benefits, and our desire to prioritise the voice of actors working with migrants, there is a literature that frames migration at the national level (Freeman 2006). This approach links the kind of policy with a kind of politics (e.g. concentrated benefits paid for broadly implies a clientelist kind of politics). Others have sought to open up the discussion of issues to look beyond a national focus and explore the broader societal and global context that informs migrant integration (Castles 2010). While the latter perspective is favoured in this report, the country reports generated useful detail on the specific nature of the integration process that was important and instructive. So, there are many occasions in this report when we examine how the details – of visa applications, of statistical definitions, of administrative institutions, of media representations – also matter in the debate. These everyday practices are how migrants and the people who support them, experience some of the challenges of integration and it is these details that can have such devastating consequences. This section introduces the broad patterns of migration and the ways that national and international responses have framed the process of integration of migrants into their communities.

The **rate of migration** has been increasing for a number of years now, if not at a steady rate nor one that is equal across the member states of the EU. Since 2010, France's immigrant numbers exceeded 200,000 each year so that by the end of 2018, people "under protection" by Ofpra, the body responsible for examining refugee claimant cases, reached 278,765. In the Czech Republic we can see a similar trend increase in the number of foreigners over time (fig 3).




Figure 3 Source: Directorate of the Alien Police of the Ministry of the Interior)

Awareness of this increase in migration has had increasing salience across different regions and towns and cities of all sizes. In Italy the foreign population has tended to live in the more developed regions of the North and Center and less so in the South and Islands. Lombardy, Lazio, Emilia- Romagna and Veneto all have around 10% of their population recognised as foreign citizens, slightly less than the urban conurbations of Rome (13%), Milan (14%) and Turin (10%) but much more than Brescia (12.4%) and Naples (4.4%). While in Belgium migration policy is a federal government issue, the integration of migrants is mainly a community level competence, so there have been significant regional differences concerning the migration balance. The Flemish Region (the Dutch-speaking part of the country) had a migration balance of about 25,000 in 2018 while the migration balance of the Walloon Region (the French-speaking part of the country) was just over 8,000 in the same year.

The **impression of growing numbers of migrants** was sometimes recognized in the growth of foreign languages – for example Ukrainian and Russian in Poland - “heard on the street”. Where there is more comprehensive data, as in Italy for example, reports can refer to the importance of immigration for the demography of the host society. Since 2014 lower national fertility rates have meant an annual loss of Italian citizens equivalent to a large city like Palermo (677.000 people). This loss has been compensated, in the same period, by new citizens (over 638.000) and the simultaneous increase of over 241.000 foreign residents. The contribution of immigrants to the

demographic reproduction of Italy is therefore significant. It is a similar story in Spain where the number of Spaniards fell in 2017 by 20,337, mainly due to declining fertility was compensated by a foreign population increase of 152,600 from non-Spaniard immigration. The international migration balance increased in 2017 for the second consecutive year to reverse a serious population decline that began in 2010. This increase was due to the fact that, while almost 400,000 left Spain to go abroad, over half a million people chose to live in Spain. During 2017 Spain registered a positive migratory balance of a 24% increase in immigrants entering the country. By contrast, in the Netherlands the high level of emigration, which continues today, runs counter to demographic norms in Western European countries, and has caused concern among politicians and the media. The country report describes concerns over the density of population in Holland and refers to a 2008 study that cited the high population density and the political climate as the major reasons many Dutch were either dreaming of leaving or actually doing so. The relationship between migration and public opinion will be discussed in a separate report.

While there may be a trend for an increase in migration **the sources of migrants varies considerably by member state**. In the Czech Republic citizens of the Ukraine, Slovakia and Vietnam represented 54.9% of all foreigners with a residence permit. In Italy (as of 1 January 2019), the largest three foreign communities were from Romania (23% of total immigrants), Albanians (8.4%) and Moroccan (8%). In France, Sub-Saharan African immigrants have been more recent especially from French ex-colonies like Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal. Since the 1970s migration has tended to come from Eastern Europe and Turkey with the lowest group of immigrants come from Asia, mainly from French ex-colonies in South East Asia like Cambodia, Laotian Vietnam. This immigration is rather recent and linked to the retreat by westerners from Asia after the Vietnam War. In Spain around 14% of immigrants were Spanish while the main nationalities of foreign immigrants were Moroccan (with 39,847 arrivals in Spain in 2017), Colombian (34,210) and Venezuelan (31,468). Immigration flows increased in the 15 main countries of origin of foreigners, especially among people of Peruvian nationality (75.2% more than in 2016), Venezuelan (70.0% more) and Honduran (67.4% more). Greek immigration has been dramatically effected by the war in Syria.

In part, **historical events that are central to a nation's story can explain these variations**. Since its creation in 1993, the Czech Republic quickly became an attractive destination for migration and transit. Until the 1990s there was no migration policy and, for foreigners present in the country, there was no legal way (except of marriage with the Czech citizen) to be naturalized. Migration policy was based on individual cases. On EU accession a policy evolved and from 2000 until 2008 the number of migrants doubled and reached 450 000 people. Post GFC in 2008, migration policy became tighter and limited access for foreigners to the Czech Republic with new rules and migration policies regularly appearing that make it more difficult for foreigners to understand the legislative framework. Non-governmental organizations, dealing with migration issue, are always updated on this issue and are the best source of information for foreigners.

Such historical relationships can have marked effects on the **types of migration** that take place. A characteristic feature of migration to Poland is the seasonality and repetitiveness of trips to and from Poland by single households. This means that Ukrainian citizens, in particular, take up seasonal or contractual work for years without making any integration efforts at all - they plan to return to their country of origin. According to the report

entitled “Work Immigration Barometer - H1 2018” published in late March 2018, half of all Ukrainian employees remain in Poland between 4 weeks and 3 months. Only 14% stay from 6 to 12 months. For vast majority of people, emigration is economic, repetitive and short-lived. Over 62% intend to come back to work again, but three quarters do not plan to stay in Poland permanently.

Historical ties can also have enduring **impacts on the migrant population**. In Estonia a large Russian-speaking minority population has lived in the country and inherited settlement patterns that have not changed much since the end of the Soviet period. Ethnic divisions have become apparent in different domains of daily life, especially in the last decade, as Russian-speaking immigrants have become concentrated in specific neighbourhoods in larger cities and industrial areas. As with other minority groups, mobility has tended to follow pre-existing ethnic networks and asocial infrastructure (e.g. education system, child-care facilities) based on language. Consequently many in the Russian-speaking minority population strongly self-identify themselves with a Russian identity. Ethnic residential segregation is persistent and can create problems with social integration.

For most countries migration is a **complex phenomenon describing combination of drivers and historical events**. The Netherlands, for example, experiences four main streams of immigration: Asylum seekers, Family reunification arrivals, Intra-European Union migration and Longstanding migration from the colonies. The last major wave of emigration occurred during the post war period. For a few years in the early 00s, the migration balance was negative but now net immigration is the driver for population growth. In mid-2017 the UN estimates indicated slightly more than 1 million Dutch citizens lived abroad, while campaigners for dual-citizens’ rights, under the rallying cry ‘Once Dutch, Always Dutch’ suggested a range of between 700,000 and 1,2 million expatriates in 2015.

The immigrant-background share of the Dutch population and its diversity has grown in recent years. When considering both immigrants and Dutch natives who have at least one parent born outside the Netherlands, the migrant-origin share of the population stood at 23,1% in 2018. Of the nearly 4 million people with a migrant background, roughly 2 million are from non-Western countries. Holland’s imperial ties are evident in the sources of migration (fig 4).

Dutch migrant by nationality¹

Country of Origin	Number of Immigrants
Turkey	400,000
Morocco	391,000
Indonesia	364,000
Germany	357,000
Suriname	350,000
Antilles and Aruba	151,000
Poland	161,000

Figure 4 Source: CBS, 2015

Migration therefore varies across countries in rate, origins, type, salience, history and impact so it is not surprising it is seen as chaotic and out of control. Given that this uncertainty over the phenomenon is as much a product of the way it is discussed and managed as it is of the ways that migrants intersect with populations, there is a real need to promote better discussions of the experiences of both sides in understanding their mutual fears, hopes and frustrations.

¹ Note: "Migrant background" includes both immigrants and the Dutch born who have at least one parent born outside the Netherlands. Sources: Central Statistical Office (CBS), "Bevolking naar migratieachtergrond," news release, November 21, 2016, [available online](#); CBS, "Bevolking, huishoudens en bevolkingsontwikkeling; vanaf 1899," statistics table, updated December 29, 2017, [available online](#); CBS, "Bevolking; generatie, geslacht, leeftijd en migratieachtergrond, 1 januari," statistics table, updated May 14, 2018, [available online](#); CBS, "Bevolking; kerncijfers," statistics tables, updated October 30, 2018, [available online](#).

IV. The Making of the Migrant and the politics of definition

The **politics of migration** has become increasingly pressing since the 2015 refugee crisis. As images of refugees spread across the media shocking images of suffering and distress were mirrored by populism campaigns designed to whip up support for nationalist politicians. In this section we examine three factors from the reports that impacted on the politics of migration: the **political structure of migration policy** in Belgium, the **economic logic informing migration policy**, the **rise of populism** in the Netherlands and finally the role of **international organisations** in the recognition of migrants in Greece.

1. Political structures and migration policy

Belgium is a country **divided by languages and regional identities**. The structures used to manage migration are complex in their allocation of responsibility and delivery of migration policy. Issues of migration and international protection mostly fall under the competence of the federal government while the integration issues are mainly the competence of the Communities. However, in Wallonia, this is transferred to the Region. As for economic migration, it has been further devolved, with the law of 6 January 2014, transferring most competences from the federal to the Communities and Regions in this area. As a result, the responsibility of developing an economic migration policy according to the needs of the labor market and economy fall under the Regions and German-speaking Community. (ibid)

In Belgium, there are several institutions in the field of asylum and migration. The first institution is **The Immigration Office** which in charges of delivering public services in the areas of the entry, residence, settlement and removal of foreign nationals. It is also responsible for applying the Dublin III Regulation and of managing applicants' residence requirements throughout the international protection procedure.

Another institution is called **The Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons** (CGRS). It is an independent federal administration being the central authority for processing applications for international protection and granting or denying refugee status or subsidiary protection status. This institution also provides certificates and documents of civil status to recognized refugees and stateless persons. There is **the Council for Alien Law Litigation** (CALL) which acts as an appeal court against the decisions of CALL (e.g. granting of protection status) and CGRS (such as decisions concerning residence permits, visas, etc). **The Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers** (Fedasil) is mainly responsible for the reception of applicants for international protection and some other categories of foreign nationals. It is also the coordinating body of Belgium in the field of assisted voluntary return, and it undertakes this responsibility in coordination with the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The federal State Secretary for Asylum Policy AND Migration supervises Fedasil. There is also a small independent body, **The Federal Migration Centre** (also called as Myria), who analyses migration and defends the rights of foreigners. Myria also undertakes the fight against human trafficking and smuggling. Along with these institutions,

there are several other relevant institutions in the field of migration and asylum as well. The Council of State (Supreme Administrative Court), the Federal Police, Unia - the Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities, the Federal Public Service (FPS) Foreign Affairs, the FPS Justice, the FPS Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue and the Regional/Community ministries in charge of integration and of employment are among these institutions. (ibid)

The Belgian law regarding refugees and other categories of foreigners are based on the ground of **Belgian Constitution** (Deboutte, 2017). The Article 191 of the Constitution declares that "... every foreigner, who is residing on Belgian soil, must have the same protection as Belgian citizens regarding their goods and the personal integrity, apart from exclusions by the law" (ibid). The law dated 15 December 1980, also called as the Immigration Act, is the main law in the fields of migration and asylum in Belgium and it deals with the issues on access to the territory, residence, settlement and removal of foreign nationals (EMN, 2018). It also governs the procedure for international protection and the competences of the institutions for international protection (ibid). This law states that two categories of people do not need to have an ID in order to stay in territory of Belgium (Deboutte, 2017). First, there are asylum seekers whose request is not rejected or whose request is handled by the Raad van State for an appeal. Second foreigners, who can prove that they do not have any documents, can stay in Belgium soil without having an ID (ibid).

The legislation has been modified many times adoption most significantly in 2016 to repatriate or move on people seen as a threat for the public health (Deboutte, 2017). Reception Act of 12 January 2007 regulates the reception conditions for applicants of international protection and for certain other categories of foreign nationals (EMN, 2018).

The law of January 2012 provides refugees and other **categories of foreigners with basic rights and resources** (Deboutte, 2017) to create standards for the material support (e.g. clothing, food, medical, social and psychological help) for people who meet the conditions stated in the law (ibid). There are some other laws and implementing decrees concerning different issues in the area of asylum and migration. For example, the law of 30 April 1999 and the implementing decree of 9 June 1999 regulate the access to work of foreign nationals. There are other implementing decrees and circular letters in the fields of migration law, such as transporters' sanctions, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking, etc (ibid).

The Belgian system of migration control has adapted since the **financial crash**, in many ways that are positive and enable integration (CEC 2020a). But these changes also reflect a general trend to restrict migration since the 1970s (Gsir et al 2016) and many of the 19 regions responsible for implementing the policies seem reluctant (eg CCB 2019). But it is not atypical in that the complexity of the system is in part a product of the range of priorities, institutions and actors that inform migration policy (Eule et al 2018). In many cases these are most evident in the categories that define who a migrant is. In doing so these simplify extremely complex issues, often conflating refugee with economic migrants as a way to exonerate nativist agendas. While much work has been done to come up with more sensitive distinctions and perhaps more sensitive subcategories, the act of categorization

denies much of the variation in migrant motivations to leave their home as well as naturalising political constructions of society (as “under threat” from migrants) from wider debate (Crawley & Skleparis 2018).

All of the countries in our study had different political systems that organised migration policies differently. This characteristic of difference is of course a product of member states wanting to retain the capacity to regulate access to the populations they govern. But what would it be like to enter this system of changing national priorities, procedures and prejudices? Once a refugee has overcome the enormous emotional and physical challenge of making it to Europe, it seems like the reception could be confusing and alienating, even when well intentioned.

2. The economic logic of migration policy

Estonia is at least explicit about the direction of its migration policies: “The declared goal of the current Estonian immigration policy is the admission of foreigners who give added value to the society and who are in line with the public interest (Ministry of the Interior 2015).” Since regaining independence Estonian immigration policy essentially has been **characterised as conservative**. (Siseministeerium 2013), a policy characteristic that has defined the setting of the volume of migrants allowed. In migration policy, conservativeness refers to the restrictions established for entry and stay of immigrants (based on the volume and origin of immigrants or reason for migration). Restrictions on immigration, such as the annual immigration quota and specific grounds (working, studying, family reunification) for granting residence permits were already set up in the process of Estonia regaining independence. These main instruments, although revised over time, based on EU legislation and labour market needs, are still in effect in Estonian immigration policy today.

The conservative approach to migration following re-independence **was a reaction to largescale immigration during the Soviet time**, which resulted in one of the largest foreign populations in Europe. In order to manage subsequent immigration, an annual immigration quota was established by the Immigration Act. The size of the quota was based on the notion that the number of new arrivals should correspond to the integration capacity of the society. This level was set to 0.1% of the permanent population of Estonia. In the beginning of the 1990s it corresponded to approximately 1,600 immigrants per year. The same level is used today, but due to a decrease in population it affects the settlement of about 1,300 TCN in Estonia per year.

The **level of the immigration quota has not been changed significantly since it was established**, however the list of groups who are allowed to settle in Estonia outside the quota has been expanded. Initially the quota was not applied to Estonians, Estonian citizens and their descendants, or foreigners who had registered their place of residence in the former Estonian SSR. Ensuing from the foreign policy and economic interests of Estonia, the EU MS nationals, citizens of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland were exempt from the quota in 1997. Two year later US nationals and citizens of Japan were exempt from the quota. At the same time restricting immigration for educational purposes by immigration quota was also stopped.


Since 2002 all **family reunification cases were exempt from the quota system**. Currently the quota is applied only to labour migrants from third countries, who make up about a tenth of the total immigration to Estonia and less than a third of the immigration from third countries. As of 2017 labour migrants coming to work in the ICT sector or in a start-up company are exempt from the quota. TCN can come to Estonia to work, to study or reunite with their family, which are also the most common grounds for granting resident permits. In addition, there are other types of residence permits, but they are based more on making exceptions and implementing international law (e.g. applicants for international protection, victims of human trafficking) (Asari & Maasing, 2017).

In Poland new regulations have sought to **balance a shortage of around 140,000 workers in key sectors, notably in construction, production, commerce and logistics, with a nationalist political agenda**. The growth in migrant work has been to make up for a loss of workers in Poland migrating to UK, Germany etc in search of higher pay, effectively replacing them with less protected agency workers. The most frequent purpose of foreigners' stay in Poland is to take up employment - 73% of cases in 2018. In 2018, the highest increase in the number of residence permits concerned mainly citizens of:

- Ukraine - by 33.9 thousand to 179 thousand people,
- Belarus - by 4.7 thousand to 20 thousand people,
- India - by 1.9 thousand to 8.8 thousand people,
- Georgia - by 1.3 thousand to 2.9 thousand people,
- Vietnam - by 0.7 thousand to 12.4 thousand people.

Growing labour shortages in Poland

Number of unfilled vacancies, quarterly average (000s)



Source: Eurostat
© FT

Figure 4 Source: Pronczuk 2019

But while the demand for migrant workers is present and the supply is available, if increasingly from further afield locations in Asia, the procedures for accessing work in Poland are seen as prohibitive. In the country report for Poland a wide range of definitions based on permits describe migrant access as categories of employees:

- Employment on the basis of a **work permit**

This obligation applies to nationals of countries outside the EU, the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland. Permits are issued for a period of up to 3 years. The employer must demonstrate that it is not possible to employ a worker from Poland or from an EU country, EEA country or Switzerland.

- Employment on the basis of a **seasonal work permit**

In 2018 a change in the regulation of employment of foreigners for short-term work led to a new type of permit for third-country nationals: a seasonal work permit for a maximum of 9 months in a calendar year in the fields of agriculture, horticulture and tourism.

- Employment on the basis of a **declaration on entrusting performance of work** to a foreigner

Since 2018 employers must pay a fee for each registered declaration and inform the District Employment Office about the actual commencement of work by a foreigner on their start date. This applies to citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine (former USSR countries) to perform work for a period of 6 months within 12 consecutive months

- Employment **without a work permit**

Citizens of EU member states, European Economic Area (EEA) countries and Switzerland may take up employment in Poland without the need to obtain a work permit.

- In case of employment of foreigners who come to Poland to start full-time higher education studies or doctoral studies and hold student visas and a residence card, a work permit is not required.
- Delegating workers

The number **of work permits has increased by more than five times in recent years** - from 61.1 thousand in 2015 to 328.8 thousand – mainly for foreigners working short term on the basis of declarations on entrusting work. The number of declarations of intent to entrust work to a foreigner increased from 782.2 thousand in 2015 to 1824.5 thousand in 2017, i.e. more than twice, and in 2018 it amounted to 1582.2 thousand. In 2018, however, the new form of employment should be taken into account and the number of seasonal work permits of 121.4 thousand should be added into the calculation.

The estimated number of employed foreigners on the basis of data from the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy and the Social Insurance Institution (data in thousands):

Figure 5. Employed Foreigners in Poland

	2015	2016	2017	2018
Work permits (up to 3 years)	54.9	112.2	212.1	295.9
Seasonal work permits	-	-	-	48.6
Declarations of entrusting work	273.8	459.9	638.6	632.9
Number of foreigners entitled to take up employment without permits	87.5	105.9	133.1	162.6
Number of persons insured with the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS)	184.2	293.2	440.3	569.1
Total foreign workers	416.3	678.0	983.7	1140.0

Figure 5 Source: country report

In 2018, the citizens of 125 states and 2 stateless persons were granted work permits in Poland in total. They were **most often issued for Ukrainian citizens**. 72.5% of foreigners who were granted permission to work in Poland had a Ukrainian passport. The majority of Ukrainian citizens use a simplified employment procedure based on the declarations, which allows them to work legally for six months within a 12 month period, so they treat their stay in Poland as an opportunity for short-term earnings. The second largest nation receiving work permits in Poland was Nepalese citizens - with a 6.1% share in the total number of such individuals. Their largest share was reported in Opolskie Voivodeship (12.8%). Apart from the abovementioned nations, it is worth noting that in 2018 a significant percentage of permits was also granted to Indian and Bangladeshi citizens (2.5% each). The largest number of work permits – as high as one in four - for citizens of these countries was issued in the one region of Mazowieckie Voivodeship. A significant share of permits was also granted to citizens of Belarus and Georgia with most foreigners having temporary residence permits connected to their employment.

Migration policy challenges a nations view of itself so it is unsurprising that the arguments for migration have to be made powerfully. Perhaps this is why the logic of economic necessity is so common? Certainly the assumption that migrants are all following economic benefits relies on economic assumptions of demand and supply, as well as perfect information and rational choice. But these logics are flawed and problematic. Not least they overemphasis the scarcity of resources to share (wages, jobs, welfare) rather than the shared opportunities that migration offers (innovation, cultural diversity, global collaboration). Furthermore economic arguments are often made in the abstract rather than the real life experience of workers or migrants and often by elites rather than communities. Small wonder there is confusion and resentment! **More transparency and discussion of migration is needed at the local community level to engage with the benefits and hopes rather than fears and prejudices** associated with migration, as we see beneath.

3. Migration and populism in the Netherlands

The Netherlands is one of the most **densely populated** countries in the world, and with nearly 509 people per square kilometer in 2017, it is the most crowded EU member state. The high population density has a mixed sociological impact. Close proximity to others can lead to a high level of tolerance and compromise among groups, according to some sociologist. Other historians and philosophers point to 17th century religious wars and subsequent reformation to show that what is considered as 'normal' can be immediately visible and can give rise to strong reactions. Both the presence of outsiders who do not (or seem not to) adapt and the rise of vocal opposition to other ethnic, racial or religious groups, could be said to challenge the balance.

Over the last twenty years, the Netherlands has gone **from the forefront of multiculturalism** to witnessing a **rise in far-right populism**- with immigration, and a focus on Islam. Where the government and population once handled immigrant integration with famed Dutch tolerance, some have grown deeply intolerant of newcomers, equating immigration with a rise in religious extremism and terror, and a loss of prosperity.

Indeed, despite concerns about the rising popularity of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim stances, the broader Dutch public remains committed to upholding the country as a rights-respecting, tolerant one. **Support for accepting recognized refugees remains strong**, arguably as strong as or stronger than the belief that the Netherlands should reject those who would abuse Dutch generosity or not quietly make the effort to adjust to Dutch society. That such support exists is exemplified by the fact that, as of 2018, 14,000 people were active volunteers with the Dutch Refugee Council (Vluchtelingenwerk), just one of several organizations assisting refugees in the Netherlands.

Amsterdam's mayor Eberhardt van der Laan, who died in 2017, frequently spoke of his vision for improving understanding and opening more spaces for refugees in the city. The esteem in which he was held nationally did much to allow people to feel that their ongoing tolerance of and support for newcomers is appropriate. Thus, the perspective of towns and cities on immigrations and integration is significantly different from those that seem to prevail at the national level, representing how **on the local level immigration is more accepted** than national and international debate might suggest.

In spite of this, the presence of dual nationals has posed some challenges for cities, and in at least one case sparked an international diplomatic incident. Ahead of the April 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum to expand President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's powers, Dutch Turks in Rotterdam planned a political rally in support of the move and invited several Turkish ministers. Wilders and his supporters strongly oppose Turkish political events in the Netherlands, and Rutte banned the officials from landing in Rotterdam and taking part in the gathering. One Turkish minister who was already in Germany took advantage of free movement within the Schengen area to travel to Rotterdam by car, where she was intercepted by Dutch police outside the Turkish consulate. She remained in her vehicle for several hours, until Dutch police lifted her car onto a flatbed truck and removed her, with the vehicle, back to Germany.

The **2017 coalition agreement** marked the first major opportunity to adjust Dutch refugee policy based on the lessons learned from the significant arrivals in the Netherlands and Europe more broadly in 2015 and 2015. The policy goals largely reflect the coalition's border pull to the right, and the effort to deal with the perception of stronger anti-immigrant sentiment. Many of the goals draw on unachieved ambitions of Dutch governments over the last decade or more, calling for a conceptual transformation of the global or regional approach to migration. But a conceptual shift alone cannot change the realities of individuals' choices or journeys.

For at least two decades, the Dutch position has been that **immigration and asylum are European issues requiring European solutions**. If there was a crisis in 2015, it was a crisis of European policy and of common policy to deal with those arrivals in a unified, European way. Successive Dutch governments have advocated for solutions that get to the roots of mass displacement, including addressing refugee reception capacity in regions of origin and the poverty and conflicts that give rise to migrations in the first place. The 2017 coalition reiterated these approaches, which may hold some promise in the long run, but require both significant financial resources and enormous diplomacy. In 2018, the coalition issued a plan to implement the strategy, at home, in Europe and beyond.

The coalition said it planned to increase the share of national budget devoted to **development assistance**, targeting for improvement protection capacity in regions of origin. Improving education for refugee children will be a key area of focus, alongside creating employment opportunities for refugees. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and a selection of African countries top the list for target locations. However, annual budgets since 2017 have shown no actual increases in development aid funding. The Dutch government also hopes to develop more agreements with countries closer to origins of crisis and displacement, **modelled on the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement**, which combined support for refugee protection in Turkey with limited EU resettlement places for Syrians. Whereas many commentators have proclaimed the EU-Turkey deal ineffective, or at best helped by circumstances, the European Commission, including Dutch First Vice President Frans Timmermans, are convinced that it has worked. Indeed, Timmermans has pushed the Dutch coalition partners to work on reaching more such deals in the future, but which need collaboration from EU partners to become a reality. Much of the Dutch government's plan is based on the hope of finding a coherent, EU-wide approach to reducing irregular migration. The philosophy laid out in the coalition agreement strongly implies that following the implementation of such a strategy, 'real refugees' will all find suitable solutions close to home, meaning that any who request asylum in the Netherlands can likely be returned to a place closer their origin that the Dutch deem safe.

For immigrants already in the country, the coalition partners make a strong **distinction between the right of Dutch citizens and those of refugees and immigrants**, despite their opposition to discrimination based on someone's country of origin. Lawyers point out that while a discrepancy between nationals and non-humanitarian immigrant might be permitted, under international law there should not be any difference in the right of nationals and recognized refugees. However, the coalition has signalled it plans to cut the rights of people granted asylum during their first years in the country. It is not clear how this would help them to integrate.

The agreement also emphasizes the need for refugees and immigrant to be proactive in their integration, or for those granted short-term protection of not gaining additional relief, if they do not. A variety of educational

channels are available to assist newcomer in acquiring Dutch language proficiency and knowledge of local systems, and the government has moved to develop an active diversity and antidiscrimination policy targeting public-sector employment.

The overall message of the current coalition has put forth that the **Netherlands would prefer to keep migrants and refugees in their regions of origin**. It will deal with them according to EU agreements if they still manage to arrive at the Netherlands but will critically evaluate all asylum claims and work toward returning those deemed not in need of protection. Under the coalition agreement, eight reception centers across the Netherlands will house rejected asylum seekers who agree to cooperate in being returned to their country of origin within two months. If they do not cooperate, they can be removed from the center. Local authorities may also arrange their own, more minimal reception facilities to house such migrants for a few days, but cannot offer longer-term solutions. While the government's emphasis is on how sober these conditions will be, describing them as the provision of only 'a bed, a bath and some bread' the immediate response to the plan from Wilders was that the provision of such accommodation would only attract more migrants from Africa in particular. This perhaps demonstrates how no matter steps taken to cut services or narrow access for migrants, the rhetoric will, so long the populist voice is strong, always say it is too much too open.

Populism in the Netherlands has increased and evolved over the last two decades. In its current form populism has been defined ...

"as an ideology that considers society to be separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people." (Mudde 2019)

The 21st twist to populism is that this is **not a populism that is right wing, but a right wing politics (authoritarian and nativist) that is populist** (ibid). While right-wing politicians' words and their political victories influence debate and attract media attention, their parties have not been able to join governing coalitions. The extent of their support is also shifting: The significant showing of Baudet's FvD in the March 2019 provincial elections was primarily at the expense of Wilders' PVV. Baudet's newer brand of right-wing rhetoric, and suggestions of solutions, attracted some voters seeking change. First his party had to find members to fill the seats won- a problem Wilders has also faced.

The rise and interest in right-wing politicians means the profile of the Netherlands with regard to migration is no longer only about the fact of who is arriving, how long they are staying, or how well they are doing, but also about the way in which **perception and the politics of immigration and integration has changed**. This starts with Pim Fortuyn in the 00s. Following his murder, and the electoral success but failure in power of his eponymous party (Lijst Pim Fortuyn), the mantle was taken up by Wilders. He has done more than anyone also to fuel the anti-immigration debate in the Netherlands and ignite anti-Islam sentiment across a vocal minority of the Dutch population. He has also gained international notoriety. Wilders worked his way through the VVD party into Parliament and has been more known for speaking for the man on the street. Under police protection and moving

regularly in the face of constant threats, he is opposed to immigration, Islam and any form of immigrant integration that alters a 'pure' vision of Dutch culture. The personal is clearly not political in his case: Neither his Indonesian mother, nor his Hungarian wife, temper his outspoken public statements against Muslims, Eastern Europeans and immigrants. The newer man on the Dutch right-wing scene, Baudet, also has Indonesian ancestors, and comes from a family and cultural and intellectual figure. A self-styled eccentric intellectual who turned to politics in 2017 after his academic ambitions floundered, he has access to money, has a doctorate, and draws upon his youth, physical appearance and penchant for self-promotional stunts to raise his profile. Baudet has railed against Dutch academia, media and experts stating that they are undermining and breaking 'Boreal' Europe (a term used by right-wing European figures to indicate an Aryan, original continent).

A **crowded multiparty landscape and proportional representation system** means that gaining 14 percent of the vote makes Baudet's party, while the biggest one that is unlikely ever to attract sufficient support from mainstream parties to be able to join, let alone lead, a governing coalition. A major question for the future of Dutch politics a policies on immigration and integration in particular is whether the mainstream can resist the electoral pull to the right and reignite interest in the facts and realities on the ground. While centrist and left-leaning parties were relatively successful in the 2017 election, pulling in 36 percent of the vote between them, only D66 (Democrats 66) among them is in the coalition. The emphasis on immigration policy seemed to be clearly to the right. However, early analysis of Baudet's 2019 successes suggests that the VVD and centrist parties may see openings on the left.

In advance of the 2017 election, many commentators around the world thought Wilders' party could win, particularly in the light of the populist victories of the Leave campaign in **the Brexit referendum and of Donald Trump's** victory in the United States. However, the Dutch parliamentary system and the other parties' pact not to work with the PVV made its rise into government all but impossible. Wilders and his followers can be expected to continue to play a vocal role in shaping Dutch and European political debates around migration, but the actual policy impact of those debates is open to question.

In the Netherlands, as elsewhere, **little is 'as usual' in politics** at present. Quite how the pieces will settle remains unclear, but the rise of the PVV and arrival of the FvD and other anti-immigrant, anti-Islam voices suggests one possibility is more fragmentation and turmoil- in policy and public debates at least. On the other hand, the typical Dutch search for compromise could mean that the mainstream right-of-center parties start looking more to the left to bring balance.

The history of the Netherland has long been marked by significant immigration and emigration, and both look set to continue. The culture of the country has long been one of openness and tolerance, with a vibrant cultural and sporting scene that encompasses many immigrant and refugee writers, comedians, thinkers, scholars, activist and athletes. While there are global, regional and national concerns about the impacts of migration and religious extremism supporting a seeming rise in Dutch intolerance to newcomers, the reality on the ground at the local level tends to show a different picture. **Multiculturalism may be weakened, and integration a heated topic. But**

it is not yet clear that right-wing rhetoric will transform the Netherlands into a closed society. In the end, actions speak louder than words.

4. Migration and International Organisations

However national policy does not take place in a vacuum and there are significant international and European conventions that frame how member states respond to migration. UNHCR works with the Greek Government, local authorities and NGOs to provide urban accommodation and cash assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers in Greece. ESTIA, the **Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation** programme, is funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund of the European Union and, according to the most recent available data of July 2019, this has made 22,201 accommodation places available (20,701 on the mainland and 1,500 on the islands) of which 98.7% are occupied.²

The UNHCR and the UN children's emergency fund UNICEF have been working closely with the Greek government for the last few years **to improve the access to education for refugee and asylum-seeking children in Greece**; admittedly with rather positive results. At the end of 2017, the UNHCR estimated that around 8,000 refugee and asylum-seeking children were enrolled in Greek schools. By the end of 2018, that number had risen to 11,000, while for the 2019-2020 school year there are further indications that more children will enroll to formal education so that number will increase.³ The 11,000 is slightly more than half of all school-age asylum-seeking kids currently in Greece; yet the numbers vary depending on where the kids live. In mainland Greece, school attendance is higher for refugee and migrant children, for those on the islands, access to schools is still a challenge. Indeed, in July 2018, a research undertaken by Human Rights Watch on access to education on the Greek islands found that fewer than 15% of migrant children on the Greek islands were enrolled in formal education at the end of the 2017-2018 school year.⁴

In September 2018, NGOs, UNHCR and IOM, provided detailed information for better **planning regarding accommodation sites in Greece, migrant children in Reception and Inception Centres (RIC)**. They found that on Lesbos, Chios and Samos did not have access to formal education, while less than 25% of the children remaining in the RICs of Leros and Kos had access to formal education.⁵ That is why the UNHCR begun to open "non-formal education centers" on the islands of Kos, Chios and Leros. The latest center to open was KEDU on the island of Kos, in April 2018, and today welcomes about 100 children a day; a third of them girls. According to the UNHCR, over 400 children have gone through its doors since they opened. The center is administered by a UNHCR partner, ARSIS, a Greek-wide organization, which offers social support for young people. Although it is called a "non-formal

² <http://estia.unhcr.gr/en/estia-accommodation-capacity-weekly-update-2-july-2019/>

³ <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/15278/education-is-a-basic-human-right-but-how-many-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-have-access-to-that-right-in-greece>

⁴ Human Rights Watch. 2018. *Without Education They Lose Their Future: Denial of Education to Child Asylum Seekers on the Greek Islands*. Available at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/07/18/without-education-they-lose-their-future/denial-education-child-asylum-seekers>

⁵ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/66038>

education center", KEDU has a curriculum and structured lessons. They teach science, arts, craft, mathematics, geography, history, Greek and English.⁶

The international focus on Greece has been closely associated with the refugee crisis of 2015. But in other countries international obligations are not considered as important. In terms of international protection, it is still the case that **the Czech Republic is a country that is not preferred by applicants for international protection** compared to other EU Member States. In 2018 a total of 1701 applications for international protection were registered. The Czech Republic registers significantly fewer applicants for international protection than neighbouring Germany, Austria and Poland.

In 2018 foreigners from 75 countries applied for international protection in the Czech Republic. Stateless applicants submitted a total of 20 applications. The majority of applications have been submitted by the citizens of Ukraine (24,6%). From 2004 they have been the largest group of applicants for international protection. They usually **submit their applications after several years of residence in the Czech Republic with an effort to legalize their residence**. Other TOP10 nationalities were nationals of Georgia (9,9%), citizens of Cuba (9,1%), nationals of Armenia (6,9%), citizens of Vietnam (5,9%), Uzbekistan (5,8%) and Russia (5,3%), citizens of Iraq (3,8%), Azerbaijan (2,6%) and Turkey (2,3%).

Of the total of 1701 applications for international protection in 2018, 80% were submitted for the first time and 20% were done again. Gender wise, in 2018 71,1% of applicants were men. 15,8% of applicants for international protection were minors, coming mainly from Armenia (28.2%), Azerbaijan (24.4%), Iraq (21.5%), Russia (20%), Ukraine (16.7%). In 2018 the Ministry of Interior issued a total of 1731 decisions in proceedings on granting international protection and 1361 decisions in proceedings on the extension of subsidiary protection. 858 persons were registered in proceedings (persons whose application has not yet been decided). 165 foreigners were granted international protection in the form of asylum or subsidiary protection in 2018. In 2018 international protection in the form of asylum was granted to 47 applicants (nationals of China, Ukraine, Syria, Myanmar) and subsidiary protection was granted to 118 applicants (nationals of Syria, Iraq, Ukraine).

In **Poland**, despite relatively high figures of migrants enabled to stay by legalisation concerning employment and education, and other reasons, the figures concerning international protection granted in Poland are relatively low. In order to understand these statistics well, it is necessary to familiarise oneself with various forms of protection provided for by Polish legislation.

In Poland, an applicant for international protection may receive:

- a) a positive outcome (approval), i.e. refugee status
- b) subsidiary protection
- c) tolerated stay - a permit for tolerated stay may be granted to persons who have been refused refugee status and subsidiary protection and who cannot be expelled to their country of origin due to, inter alia, the mental or physical condition of the foreigner, lack of and inability to obtain a travel document, if the expulsion would

⁶ <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/15278/education-is-a-basic-human-right-but-how-many-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-have-access-to-that-right-in-greece>

result in violation of their right to live in a family or the rights of a child and would thus violate international conventions ratified by Poland.

Statistics on various forms of international protection:

2016:

Number of approvals issued:

- number of approvals - refugee status: 128
- number of approvals - subsidiary protection: 196
- number of approvals - tolerated stay: 66

TOTAL: 390

Number of lodged applications for international protection: 12,345

2017:

Number of approvals issued:

- number of approvals - refugee status: 151
- number of approvals - subsidiary protection: 372
- number of approvals - tolerated stay: 35

TOTAL: 558

Number of lodged applications for international protection: 5,099

2018:

Number of approvals issued:

- number of approvals - refugee status: 185
- number of approvals - subsidiary protection: 219
- number of approvals - tolerated stay: 30

TOTAL: 434

Number of lodged applications for international protection: 4,147

This means that between 2016-2018 only 1382 decisions granting refugee status, subsidiary protection or tolerated stay were issued to foreigners. In 2018, the largest number of applications for international protection in Poland were submitted by citizens of Russia (in practice, this mainly means Chechnya) - 2.7 thousand persons, Ukraine - 466 persons and Tajikistan - 144 persons. Almost 1.4 thousand foreigners applied again. Almost half of all refugee status applicants were minors and women - the highest rates in Europe. The above figures show a significant decrease in the number of applicants for international protection in Poland compared to previous years.

Moreover, in the opinion of many NGOs monitoring the state of human rights in Poland (Amnesty International, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Association for Legal Intervention, The Halina Nieć Legal Aid Center) and the Ombudsman, Poland does not respect the right of foreigners to submit asylum applications - this right is

systematically violated at the Polish-Belarusian border crossing in Terespol, where foreigners from Chechnya, Ukraine and Tajikistan try to submit applications for protection. Foreigners are not able to effectively submit an application for international protection there. Applications are not accepted and applicants are sent back to Belarus. Border Guard officers refuse to allow the submission of applications for international protection even in situations where foreigners clearly ask for it. This tense situation has existed there since of 2016 - foreigners repeatedly, day after day, try to cross the border and file an application for international protection.

As Amnesty International wrote in the letter to the Minister of the Interior and Administration, Mariusz Błaszczak: "The main reasons for **these negative "decisions"** were the lack of the legal travel documents and **conclusion that people attempting to enter Poland were "economic migrants"**. The Ombudsman's inspection carried out on 11 August 2016 concluded that the Border Guards were de facto carrying out an assessment whether a given person should be considered an applicant for international protection. On the day of the Ombudsman's inspection, 406 out of 436 foreigners who attempted to enter the territory of Poland were rejected".

There are two other phenomena characteristic of Poland:

Firstly, a very high percentage of cases involving **international protection end in discontinuance**. This is the case when the applicant leaves Poland, usually illegally travelling to other EU countries. In subsequent years, the following number of international protection cases were discontinued:

- 2016 9690 (out of 12345 accepted applications)
- 2017 2959 (out of 5099 accepted applications)
- 2018 2121 (out of 4147 accepted applications)

A high number of foreigners move to countries of Western Europe even as their asylum proceedings are pending. This is a consequence of the **meagre integration offer for immigrants in Poland** and the existence of large diasporas in Western Europe, where foreigners hope to find support. Compared to the EU average, Poland accepts significantly fewer refugee applications (the EU average being approximately 50%, against Poland's roughly 10% acceptance rate). Furthermore, foreigners may be deterred from seeking asylum in Poland by how often applications are considered unfairly. The Helsinki Foundation has handled many cases in which immigration authorities either failed to properly investigate evidence of torture against applicants or disregarded such evidence entirely.

Secondly, in some periods Poland receives more applicants for protection from other EU countries, mainly from Germany, than from regions at threat. This is a result of the Dublin agreements and of return to Poland of people who, after applying for asylum in Poland, went to other EU member states.

Interestingly, Poland has very limited knowledge about persons who were granted protection after the first year of stay while they benefit from the support of government integration programmes. The only statistical information available on this group is the total number of people (including gender, age and nationality) who hold valid residence cards. Poland also does not collect data on migrants who have acquired citizenship in Poland.

The **categorisation of a migrant and the extent of the rights they can expect to enjoy is therefore a highly political issue**. It is informed by many complex concerns that are moral as well as empirical and which relate to complex national and international legal issues. The Italian immigration discipline is traditionally articulated into 2 main typologies: entry visas and residence permits. There are many regulatory levels (about twenty) depending on the different motivations underlying migration: tourism, work, health, etc. Each entry visa (and consequently a residence permit) is therefore subject to an ad hoc regulation that regulates the release requirements and the corresponding status, such as rights and obligations of the holder in Italy. Exceptions to this fundamental principle are asylum and international protection international that allow, notwithstanding the general visa regulations, to enter a foreign State without having previously requested a Visa. The current regulatory framework relates the different types of permanent residence in Italy to two major "macro-categories": work and family. However, the staying linked to family ties is strictly dependent on an employment contract of at least one of the family members with which he/she can financially support the whole family.

The complex discipline that regulates entry and residence in Italy is summarized in the **Unified Text on Immigration (T.U.I.)**, according to which the main regular entry channel in Italy is work. In fact, and as repeatedly denounced by numerous organizations, this channel is essentially closed. Several researches and various organizations, including Caritas, trade unions, ASGI, ACLI, underline how the discipline is not suitable to face the current situation and call for legislative. The mechanism hypothesized by the legislation on immigration - which presupposes that the worker, at the time of the hiring proposal, is in his/her country of origin - is irreconcilable with the normal working mechanisms of the labor market, based on direct knowledge between employer and worker. The current legislation provides, in fact, that entries for work reasons are regulated by the Government, which has the duty to establish annually the contingent of foreign persons authorized to enter Italy for work reasons, on the basis of a multi-year program according to the production needs of the country.

In reality, since 2007 Italy has not adopted any multi-year program for entry flows and **since 2011 the different Governments have actually "closed" this channel, by providing only entry quotas for specific groups of people** (e.g. foreign citizens of Italian origin). This non-compliance between legislation and labor market dynamics manifests itself with extreme evidence in some occupational sectors: for example in the health and personal care sector, where the demand grows and the foreign workforce plays a leading role. One of the consequences of this closure and the dichotomy between labor market and immigration regulations, is the increase of so-called "overstayers", people from "visa free countries" coming for short-term stays, that extend their stay in Italy in search of a "black job " (typical is the case of people coming from South American countries). The reintroduction of a regular entry channel for job search and the simplification of the procedures related to releases / renewals of residence permits (for example the requirement of housing suitability) would certainly respond more realistically to labor and market dynamics, promoting effective and also preventing irregular migration, to protect people, who would benefit from a secure entry channel rather than "relying" more often on criminal organizations linked to human trafficking.

In fact, currently, the only regular entry channel in Italy is given by the request for International Protection.

Italy has never addressed the issue of refugees and arrivals by sea in a systematic way but always with an emergency approach, which has proved inadequate over time. The right to asylum and international protection has progressively become the only instrument of protection for many migrants, with a risk of abuse by the organizations of the human traffickers.

In 2018, however, some legal changes were introduced, which led to serious consequences for the protection of rights and the reception system as a whole.

The **Decree Law 113/2018 (so called “Salvini Decree”)** deleted the rule that allowed the qualified issuance of a residence permit for humanitarian reasons in cases where the Territorial Commission considered the existence of serious humanitarian reasons under constitutional or international obligations. Following the entry into force of the decree (from 5 October 2018), a residence permit can be issued for "special protection" only if the Territorial Commission considers the existence of the risk of persecution or the risk of torture. However **if the Commission assessed no risk**

Salvini Decree Residence permit:

- is valid for one year;
- allows work;
- can be renewed if the Commission considers that the risk of persecution or torture continues to exist;
- cannot be converted into a work permit, even if the "special protection" permit holder has a work contract.

of persecution or torture, the person would be denied the application for international protection. If an appeal was not proposed, and they could not secure another type of residence permit, they become an irregular resident. Only holders of residence permits for humanitarian reasons (valid by 5.10.18) will be able to convert this permit.

International organisations such as the UN and, in this context, the EU have extremely important roles in setting minimum understandings and obligations for countries to comply with and check their migrant integration plans against. In many cases these are legally enforceable and realised through apolitical institutions. However there remains discretion by member states who can exercise their right to veto in these policy areas. When political elites do so it often to appeal to the same constituencies who react against international collaboration in the first place. In short, **there is nothing to lose by strengthening international collaboration to support the rights of migrants.**

V. Migrants access to welfare

Once granted access to a member state, often under restrictive conditions, migrants' access to welfare varies again across EU states. The reports also indicate that there has been **significant fluidity in the legal protections for migrants access in recent years**. Again a wide range of factors are present in the reports that point to differing reasons for migrant access to welfare. These may include the form of welfare conditions in a member state, domestic policies concerning families, labour protection, education and even desert (Nielsen 2018). As well as determining the access of migrants to rights of citizenship enjoyed by incumbents, for some groups of migrants like refugees, the need for health care, housing and education may be felt desperately and urgently. This means that the mechanisms for integrating migrants into social services play a central role. Despite a wide range of studies demonstrating the net contribution that younger, often more highly skilled migrants contribute to welfare states, public opinion, often fuelled by political and media disinformation, indicates concern that migrants make demands that impinge on the access of existing users to welfare services. This tends to be a pattern evident in countries with larger welfare spending than those with less. Yet post GFC, the almost universal pursuit of austerity agendas across the EU has been far more significant in limiting the supply of welfare than migrants. Indeed the convergence in usage of migrants to provide care in Europe was noted some time ago (Williams 2012).

The tolerance of migrants in the multicultural community is not always matched by the processes for including migrants into social services in the Netherlands. The asylum-seeking process starts officially in Ter Apel, in the northern part of the Netherlands where the headquarter of the immigration service is located. People are registered and allocated a place in the asylum seeker centres here. The COA, the central organisation for organisation care for asylum seekers, runs centres professionally in the Netherlands with strict orders and security. People living in asylum seeker centres are provided by a bed, wifi and have some money every week for their daily life. They stay in care centres as long as the procedure lasts. Every week people have to 'sign in', if you are absent you have no right to get your week money. In the meanwhile, there is no contact with the environment and local society in the Netherlands. These centres are located all over the Netherlands, but especially in rural areas. **Instead of being part of the society, they are kept away from it.** Tools to reach this society are there when someone gets a permit to stay in the Netherlands. Loans are available for taking Dutch classes, to seek work and to travel around on your own. There is also a lot of media attention, both positive and negative as well initiatives from the civil society. Many of these initiatives emerged to bridge the gaps created by this asylum process in the Netherlands with Dutch grass roots activism reacting to migration events, especially from 2015 to the refugee crisis. 'The night of the refugee'⁷ is a yearly charity walk where people walk 40km in the night to both tell the stories of some refugees who are now settled in Holland and to raise money for refugees.

The COA is responsible for the provision of health care in the reception centres. In principle, the **health care provided to asylum seekers should be in line with the regular health care** applied in the Netherlands. As any other person in the Netherlands, an asylum seeker can therefore visit a general practitioner, midwife or hospital.

⁷ <https://www.gelderlander.nl/nijmegen/massaal-wandelen-van-nijmegen-naar-arnhem-vluchteling-blijf-je-misschien-wel-je-hele-leven~a3732488/>

As of 1 January 2018, the *Regeling Medische zorg Asielzoekers* (RMA) Healthcare was the first point of reference for asylum seeker who had health issues. The relevant legal provision (Article 9(1)(e) RVA) was elaborated in the Healthcare for Asylum Seekers Regulation (*Regeling Zorg Asielzoekers*). According to the latter, asylum seekers have access to basic health care. This includes *inter alia*, hospitalisation, consultations with a general practitioner, physiotherapy, dental care (only in extreme cases) and consultations with a psychologist. If necessary, an asylum seeker can be referred to a mental hospital for day treatment. There are several institutions specialised in the treatment of asylum seekers with psychological problems.

When an asylum seeker stays in a reception facility but the RVA is not applicable, health care is arranged differently. The law of migrants states that an asylum seeker who lives outside the regular reception centres or is a rejected asylum seekers in the VBL or an adult in the GL, only has access to emergency health care. For this group, **problems can arise if there is a medical problem which does not constitute an emergency**. Care providers who do help irregular migrants who are unable to pay their own medical treatment can claim those costs from a special foundation, which then pays the costs. Problems might also arise with respect to access to health care where the asylum seeker wants to use a health care provider whose costs are not covered by their insurance. The National Ombudsman has asked the Minister of Public Health to ensure that undocumented migrants also have access to health care.⁸

All people legally based in the Netherlands have access to the health care system. When leaving the reception centre there is support to get into a suitable health insurance company; where every citizen of the Netherlands is obliged to have one.⁹ **95 percent of all migrant status holders** aged 18 not staying in the reception shelters do **have healthcare costs** but most are registered at a general practitioner and most costs are made by visiting a GP. People with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean background are less likely to report their health as good or very good than people with a native Dutch background. This trend is most noticeable among people with a Moroccan or Turkish background. 64 percent of Moroccans aged between 12 and 64 describe their personal health as good or very good, compared with 83 percent of people in the same age bracket who do not have a migration background. This is particularly noteworthy because the average age of people with a Moroccan migration background is lower than that of people without a migration background, and young people tend to be more positive on average about their health. First-generation Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans are significantly less likely than the second generation to describe their personal health as good or very good. The difference between the generations is greatest among Moroccans and Turks. One relevant factor in this finding is that the second generation, born in the Netherlands, is significantly younger than the first generation.

In Greece, national legislation entitles asylum seekers to **free of charge access to necessary health, pharmaceutical and hospital care**, including necessary psychiatric care where appropriate. The Greek Law

⁸ Ombudsman, Report on health care for asylum seekers and rejected asylum seekers, 3 October 2013, available at: <https://www.nationaleombudsman.nl/nieuws/2013/ombudsman-onderzoekt-toegang-medische-zorg-voor-asielzoekers>

⁹ CBS 2019, Cohort study on asylum seekers and statusholders, <https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/publication/2019/16/asylum-and-integration-2019>

4368/2016, which provides free access to public health services and pharmaceutical treatment for persons without social insurance and vulnerable persons, is also applicable for asylum seekers and members of their families.¹⁰ Yet, despite the favourable legal framework, actual access to health care services is hindered in practice by significant shortages of resources and capacity for both foreigners and the local population. This is a direct result of the austerity policies followed in Greece, and a lack of adequate cultural intermediation.¹¹ According to a Council of Europe report of 2018 “the public health sector is under extreme pressure and lacks the capacity to cover all the needs for health care services, be it of the local population or of migrants”.¹² On the Eastern Aegean islands, access to health remains particularly restricted due to lack of staff, and persistent overcrowding. For example, in the RIC of Samos there was only one doctor present throughout 2018 to cover medical needs, while the population in the RIC exceeded five times the centre’s capacity. Since the doctor resigned in February 2019, health needs are now only covered by the understaffed hospital of the island.¹³ As noted by UNHCR, “across the islands and on some camps in the mainland the low number of staff under the Ministry of Health, in particular doctors and cultural mediators, is not sufficient to help refugees with medical and psychosocial needs; therefore the limited public mental health institutions in Greece are a particular concern”.¹⁴

In Italy **the Constitutional Court** repeatedly intervened in the determining immigrants access to the welfare state in 2018. One decision, judgment no. 107/2018, concerned nursery schools. A Veneto Region law provided that 15 years of prior residence of the parents in the region would grant them priority as regards the admission of their children to public nursery schools, with the clear purpose of excluding many immigrants through indirect discrimination. However, this provision was considered by the Court to be unreasonably discriminatory because it was contrary to the very rationale of the type of social benefit concerned. The Court observed that the law envisaged that nurseries would serve a dual social welfare and educational function and recognised that lawmakers are “allowed to introduce differentiated rules for access” and to favour some individuals compared to others. The Court ruled that “the selection criteria adopted must in any case respect the principle of reasonableness” and be “consistent and adequate” to tackle the situations of need referred to by the legislation. Therefore, in the case of nursery schools it is necessary to check whether there is any reasonable correlation between the requirement of 15 years prior residence and the social welfare and educational function of the service. The Court was of the view that affording priority to long-term residence as a factor for admission purposes leads to discrimination even against poor families, which is contrary to the social- welfare rationale of the service and, at the same time it is “obviously unreasonable to believe that the children of parents with deeper roots in Veneto have educational needs greater than others”. The Court thus concluded that there was unreasonable and therefore unlawful discrimination.

¹⁰ <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/law-4368/2016-article-33-on-free-access-to-health-care-services>

¹¹ <https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/reception-conditions/health-care>

¹² Council of Europe. 2018. *Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe*. Available at <https://rm.coe.int/report-on-the-visit-to-greece-from-25-to-29-june-2018-by-dunja-mijatov/16808ea5bd>

¹³ <https://rsaegian.org/en/situation-on-samos-has-reached-the-edge/>

¹⁴ UNHCR, Factsheet: Greece, January 2019. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68057>

In Belgium the Public Welfare Centre is called CPAS in French and OCMW in Dutch. The OCMW or CPAS supports individuals in need in different kinds of disciplines. They offer overall social services such as healthcare, housing, reception of asylum seekers. According to the law every individual who cannot live a humane life, is eligible for OCMW or CPAS support¹. For benefiting of this support, the nationality is not a condition. Under the certain conditions, every foreigner who resides legally in Belgium can benefit from OCMW support. The city or commune where the individual is registered, determines the responsibility of a certain OCMW. When an asylum request has been approved, the refugee or the subsidiary protected individual gets a residence permit and he or she can start seeking for a place to stay. During that journey, they can stay for another two months in the place where they have resided during the asylum procedure and they are entitled to have help of a social assistant.

A wide range of institutions were shown in the country studies to manage the access of migrants to welfare. These ranged from constitutional court decisions to entire networks of dedicated administrations. This constitutes a significant amount of national resources to keep migrants away from the privileges enjoyed by country citizens, which begs the question – **is it worth the effort?** Efficiency arguments seem to be less pressing, given that compliance with usually fairly random and contingent criteria appear in each country study. Political expediency appears to be more important with expensive and complex administrations in place mainly to guard the welfare rights of electorates. As the delivery of welfare, both in terms of tax revenue and labour requirements, becomes dependent on migration there will come a time when these burdens on both state and migrant look like expensive luxuries.

VI. Healthcare needs and access

The Italian media has sporadically whipped up alarming associations between "health" and migration for at least five decades (that is, in essence, since the migration phenomenon has assumed a social and therefore media evidence in Italy). However, a 2017 report by the Italian Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the reception, identification and expulsion system stated that almost all migrants landed on the Italian coasts were not carriers of infectious diseases and **enjoy better than average health than the countries of arrival**. If anything, these people run danger of getting sick in Italy because of the poor conditions of hygiene, malnutrition and the difficulty of access to the health system. The study carried out by the Commission examined 17,989 people, the totality of those landed in the port of Catania in 2016. This showed the highest number of cases concerned simple febrile syndromes (510) or fever and cough (191). There were only very rare cases of infectious diseases: 19 cases of pulmonary tuberculosis, 4 cases of extra pulmonary tuberculosis, 11 bacterial pneumonia, 11 gastroenteritis, 8 episodes of chickenpox, 3 of schistosomiasis, 2 HIV infections, one episode of pyelonephritis and one of spondylodiscitis. These low levels of communicable disease were due to two factors: first there was a **selection process** made before their departure by families who, when investing their savings to send a member to Europe, choose healthy candidates capable of facing the crossings in the desert and Mediterranean sea. Second, sadly many of the sick people who faced the journey died before reaching their destination.

Migrant populations can experience significant health inequalities. For some years, data on the causes of hospitalization in Italy showed that **non-communicable chronic diseases rose steadily among immigrants** in "epidemiological transition". Data up to 2016 showed high levels of immigrant males suffered from cardio-circulatory disease (14.6% of attendance, it was 9.9% in 2005) and tumours (6.9%). The same pattern applied to the female admissions, if less marked. Since 2007 Italy's Healthcare Monitoring System (PASSI) has collected information from the adult population (18-69 years) on lifestyles and risk factors to generate a picture of the current health profile and risk factors in Italy. This has explored the onset of chronic non-communicable diseases in relation to the degree of knowledge about and adherence to national prevention programs. According to PASSI immigrants are more exposed to certain risk factors for the development of chronic diseases. In particular, **immigrants have an increased risk of sedentariness** (Odds Ratio-OR = 1.3 p <0.0001), overweight / obesity (OR = 1.2 p <0.0001) and **eating less fruit and vegetables** (OR = 1.2 p <0.0001). Furthermore, immigrants from EU countries have an increased risk of being a smoker (OR = 1.1 p <0.0001) and those from the Americas tend to be consumers of alcohol at greater risk (OR = 1.2 p <0.0001). With respect to these themes, on which inducing positive and healthy behaviour is fundamental, **a little has been done towards immigrants**. For instance, among the sedentary, 27% of Italians have received the advice to practice physical activity by its doctors against the 15% of immigrants. In the case of excess of weight there is still a difference in advices between Italians and immigrants respectively 39% and 25%. This confirms the fact that for immigrants being resident longer in Italy increases the likelihood of receiving advice for adopting healthier lifestyles, but do not eliminate differences by origin.

Despite Italy's more progressive attitudes, mental health is still stigmatized as a condition, its care is often undervalued and is often underfunded. The WHO Report on the health of refugees and migrants in the Europe showed that in 2016 a greater percentage of depression (5–44%) in refugees and migrants than the general

population (8–12%). **Extended length of time within the asylum application process leads to depression and other mental disorders.** In addition poor socioeconomic conditions, unemployment and isolation are also associated with increased rates of depression in migrants and refugees after resettlement. On a smaller but significant scale the NGO Doctors Without Borders, in agreement with the Italian Ministry of Health, has developed tools for mental health assessment and care for asylum seekers arriving at the Lampedusa border in 2014-15. This documented mental health conditions, potentially traumatic events and post-migratory challenges experienced by asylum seekers in the program. Of the 385 people who presented for mental health screening during the study period, **mental health disorders were identified and diagnosed in 193 (50%).** Most were young males from West Africa who had left their countries of origin more than a year before arrival. The most common diagnoses were post-traumatic stress disorder (31%) and depression (20%).

In 2015 more than 700 thousand obstetric hospitalizations of women of childbearing age living in Italy were recorded in the Register of Hospital Discharges (SDO). 80,8% of these were Italian and the 19,2% were immigrant women. **Hospitalization rates of migrant women for obstetric reasons are about twice those of Italian women, especially in the North, where it is a higher the presence of immigrant women.** These mothers tend to be younger with a modal age of immigrant women in the 25-29 age group (30-34 years for Italian women). Younger mothers in the 15-19 age group are 3.3 times higher for immigrant women than Italian and 4.1 times higher in the 20-24 age group.

The obstetric hospitalizations of immigrant women are due in 61.2% of the cases to the delivery, in 18.0% of the cases to voluntary interruption of pregnancy, in 7.9% of cases to spontaneous interruption of pregnancy and in 12.9% of cases to other causes. In Italian women the incidence of voluntary interruption of pregnancy is lower (10.7%) and that of spontaneous interruption of pregnancy is slightly higher (9.4%). **Immigrant mothers tend to be younger.** More than half of migrant mothers gave birth before they were 29 years (29.3% for Italians), only 4.1% were over 40 (8.8% for Italian mothers) and the average age of migrant mothers was also younger (30.0 years vs 32.9 years for Italians). Regional differences were not significant other than ion marital status:. 20.7% of immigrant mothers were unmarried (28.4% among the Italians), with a minimum of 15.2% in Trento and a maximum of 36.3% in Campania.

In **Belgium** the law stipulates that asylum seekers, and other people who are eligible under the Opvangwet (reception law), have the right to healthcare and medical support in order to live a humane life. This is not the same as OCMW support which is for urgent medical help for people not eligible for help under the Opvangwet (illegal people/people who received a denial for example). When an asylum seeker has paid invoices from a hospital for example, they have the right to be reimbursed by Fedasilor OCMW. The reimbursement varies from the situation. When the asylum seeker is working, he or she needs to join a health insurance. A subsidiary protected individual or a refugee under the 1951 Convention is obliged to join a health insurance as well as their family members. But there are exceptions. Sometimes, the OCMW can decide to cover the costs when a person is for example being hospitalized or when the costs are high. The OCMW takes this decision autonomously.

In Germany, which also has an insurance based system of healthcare provision, people with a migration background are often not sufficiently and adequately provided by the health care system in Germany. Language, cultural or legally restrictive barriers (e.g. under the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act), particular health problems or discrimination can be reasons for this. But even in Germany, everyone has at least the right to the best possible medical advice and care, regardless of origin, language or culture.

Health science has shown that health/disease is linked to education, financial resources and social inclusion.¹⁵ **Many migrants do not find their way within the services and structures due to ignorance or do not make use of existing offers.** Some migrants participate below average in preventive, medical and rehabilitation services. Despite residence and work permits, an unknown number of migrants are not covered by health insurance. Refugees have an increased risk of mental illness and stress disorder due to traumatic experiences before and during their flight. Living in shared accommodation, lack of prospects and bureaucratic hurdles have a negative impact on mental health.

In NRW, migrant-specific help in the health sector is organised, promoted and further developed on a supraregional, communal level. In the Rhineland, for example, there are seven social psychiatric competence centres for migration (in Cologne, Duisburg, Solingen, Bonn, Aachen, Mülheim-Essen-Oberhausen, Mönchengladbach-Düsseldorf). **The aim of these centres is to improve access to existing psychiatric services for migrants** and to advise institutions, associations and organisations on intercultural issues. They bundle, network and coordinate psychiatric facilities and services for different migrant groups.¹⁶

In psychiatric hospitals, integration counsellors, multilingual brochures and websites as well as trained staff contribute to supporting people with a migration background in psychiatric treatment.¹⁷ Regional working groups for specialists from addiction services with a focus on migration/refugees are also an important institution for promoting integration.¹⁸ Health centres for migrants, such as the one in Cologne, **operate concretely at the local level to offer advice on questions about the German health and social system.** They also offer outpatient housing for mentally ill people, and provide information on health topics in associations, groups, mosques, etc. and support self-help groups.¹⁹

Nationwide, the Working Group on Migration and Public Health is an expert forum for the improvement of health counselling and care for migrants. Its aim is to **promote equal access to health care, prevention and health measures for migrants.** The Internet portal "Migration and Health"²⁰ is multilingual (in 40! languages) and provides information for people who are not familiar with the German health system. The Federal Centre for

¹⁵ <https://www.integrationsbeauftragte.de/ib-de/themen/gesellschaft-und-teilhabe/arbeitskreis-migration-und-oeffentliche-gesundheit-392730>

¹⁶ https://www.lvr.de/de/nav_main/kliniken/verbundzentrale/frderundmodellprojekte/frderprogramme/sozialpsychiatrisch_ekompetenzzentrenmigrationspkom; https://gfm-koeln.de/content/e684/e13/index_ger.html

¹⁷ <https://www.lwl.org/LWL/Soziales/Richtung-Inklusion/gesundheit/interkulturelle-psychiatrie>

¹⁸ www.lwl-ks.de/de/netzwerke/Arbeitskreise/AK_MigSucht

¹⁹ https://gfm-koeln.de/content/e684/index_ger.html

²⁰ <https://www.migration-gesundheit.bund.de/en>

Health Education supports key persons who have access to and trust in migrant target groups with media for counselling situations and bilingual materials.²¹

Irregular migrants are excluded from health insurance in Germany. Although they are entitled to health care under the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act, they are usually excluded because "Sans Papier" is subject to a registration obligation on the part of all authorities. This means that if a person without legal residence status applies to the social welfare office for a medical benefit, his or her data will be passed on to the foreigner's authority. However in emergencies, irregular migrants don't have to turn to the social welfare office as medical staff or the hospital can act on their behalf. This means that the social welfare office may not forward the data to the foreigner's authority. Charitable institutions such as the Malteser Hilfsdienst offer medical care for irregular migrants and people without health insurance. Here doctors **treat patients anonymously** with "medical offices" or medical networks helping to organise operations or refer patients to doctors.²²

While universal access to health care for migrants is an ideal it may not be surprising if specific health care needs associate with migration. Some of these (eg mental health) may be endemic to the experience of or the drivers for migration. But others (unsanitary camps, delayed decisions, incarceration without sentence) seem to be the **product of arriving in the wrong recipient country**. Given that younger people tend to migrate and so are likely to be with child or children, it is disturbing that there is not more resource committed to ensuring basic guarantees.

²¹ <https://www.bzga.de/programme-und-aktivitaeten/gesundheitsfoerderung-fuer-menschen-mit-migrationshintergrund/>

²² <https://mediendienst-integration.de/integration/gesundheit.html>

VII. Housing

According to several stakeholders interviewed for the Estonia report, **finding housing for refugees is a major challenge**. Renting flats from the private market has been difficult for refugees, and there are very few apartments and flats available that are owned by the State or the municipality. Rights organizations have noted the acute shortage of housing, including social housing in Tallinn in particular, and to a lesser extent in other cities and towns, as well as rural municipalities and urged Estonia to address this shortage, especially for disadvantaged and marginalized groups.

Some private individuals and parishes have offered to rent accommodation to refugees. Some of these offers have, however, been made with a view of making a profit or selling unwanted and unused real estate at a remote location (UNHCR). Apart from intolerance and xenophobia, one of the reasons why landlords are hesitant to rent apartments to refugees, is, apparently, the **length of their residence permit** with landlords not trusting tenants with relatively short (oneyear) residence permits.

It was also pointed out by those refugees who had been in Estonia for a few years that **banks do not give loans** to buy an apartment to people who do not have long-term residence permits. At the same time, local authorities do not always have sufficient information about refugees and their rights, which, when combined with landlords' unwillingness to rent flats, creates a serious obstacle to finding housing. Many refugees, particularly in Tallinn and Tartu, said they had not received support in finding an apartment. If the State could mediate, or "guarantee" the contract, it would solve many problems (UNHCR).

Under the 1951 Convention, in **Belgium refugees and dependents can benefit from social housing or rent subsidies under a few conditions**. Once the status of the refugee or dependent has been protected, asylum seekers can enroll for a subsidized housing program. There **conditions that include registration, a willingness to integrate into the host county society and to improve the language and lastly to fulfill some payment and property conditions**. Refugees and their dependents who are granted the right to subsidized housing, are put on a waiting list and if, after four years they are still on a low income, they can receive a rent allowance. People who earn yearly more than 17,500.00 EUR (plus 1,570.00 EUR per dependent person) cannot benefit from this subsidies. Once a person is granted a subsidy, he or she gets 125.57 EUR (plus 20. 93 EUR per dependent person) during a period of maximum 9 years or for the period while being on the housing list.

In **Germany immigrants are allowed to look for a flat on the housing market**. Asylum seekers, on the other hand, have a right to a self-selected home only after 24 months or if they are recognised as entitled to asylum [§ 47 AsylG from 29.07.2017]. Then they receive regular state benefits for themselves and their families (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz). Those who have a job or a training place can freely choose their place of residence. According to the Integration Act of 2016, all others must stay for three years in the federal state which is responsible for their asylum procedure (§ 12a AufenthG). Authorities can also, to a limited extent, assign a place of residence. A 2018 analysis by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees surveyed 4,500 asylum seekers between 2013 to 2016 to find that a third of people with protection status continued to live in shared

accommodation (more than half of those who were “tolerated”). Private owners were important providers of rented apartments to them. This means **that the ability of migrants to find housing depends strongly on public opinion about migrants**. In Cologne, for example, there are reports of subtle to institutional racism on the housing market, because unfamiliar family names are already known to minimize the chances of being shortlisted for a flat. Most migrants live in urban regions where housing is scarce and expensive. Immigration from third countries, however, is not of decisive importance for the housing shortage, since the vast majority of immigration to the cities results from inner-German and intra-European immigration. The cities try to provide housing through social housing and publicly subsidised social housing is allocated according to income, marital status and health needs. Nationality here is not taken into account. In many places there are waiting lists, on which a refugee stands at the end with a residence permit for a social housing.

In addition to publicly promoting the construction of social housing, the “Federal association of German housing and real estate enterprises (GdW)” unites local, cooperative, church-, enterprise-, state- and federally-owned housing enterprises. They offer nearly 30% of all rented dwellings in Germany. **Many of these housing companies offer integration-promoting measures for the social stabilisation of neighbourhoods.**²³


As soon as people arrive in the Netherlands and they start with an asylum request case, they have the **right to shelter**. The COA (Centraal Orgaan opvang asielzoekers) is the national organization that takes care of shelter and has over 50 asylum seekers centres (also known as reception centre or camp) based all over the Netherlands. Every centre has accommodation for 500 to 600 people. When people receive their papers to stay in the Netherlands they are connected to a municipality and this municipality takes over the responsibility from COA of housing of this person. Mostly this housing is organized in social housing; housing for people with low income. This is only possible until a certain level of income and the rent of those housing is not that high.

²³ An overview can be found at www.integration.wohnungswirtschaft.de

In some cities there were, and still are, some experiments with housing projects to find a solution where demand outstrips supply for migrant accommodation. For example, in Amsterdam there are housing projects where young people live together. They all got their own studio, but live together in a building, like **Startblok Riekerhaven**, with people between 18 and 27 years old.²⁴ Startblok is a unique housing project in Amsterdam for 282 status-holders and 283 Dutch youngsters. Together they build a community in which their own input and efforts are most valued. The figures for 2014 show that the Netherlands had to provide housing to almost 14.000 refugees. They were almost all housed by social housing landlords.²⁵

In Italy the **Constitutional Court** made two important decisions concerning public housing for migrants. In its judgment no.106/2018 the Court declared that the provision of a Liguria Region law was unconstitutional on grounds of violation of the principle of equality in as much as they required non-EU immigrants to have resided in Italy for 10 years in order to be eligible for public housing. The Court observed that when it comes to “an asset of long-lasting enjoyment, such as housing” the law “may require guarantees of stability which serve to prevent an excessive turnover of renters from undermining administrative action and reducing its effectiveness”. However requiring 10 years of residence appeared to be excessive and unjustifiably discriminatory because Italians and EU nationals were not subject to any conditions even remotely similar. In its judgment no. 166/2018 the Court declared that the provision of a law were unconstitutional on grounds of violation of the principle of equality. The Court noted that the rationale of the subsidy “is to support the poor so as to allow them to meet housing needs through recourse to the market”, in case of economic difficulties “related to limited periods”. Therefore, demanding that non-EU immigrants meet these residence requirements was unreasonable. It may be true that in principle “social policies aimed at satisfying housing needs can take into account how well one has put down roots locally”, but no reasonable link could be found between the rationale and effectiveness of aid linked to transient needs and 5-year or 10-year residency.

Immigrants now play a role in the Italian real estate market. From 2006 to 2018 some 860.000 real estate exchanges and trades were made with immigrants, with a turnover of just under 100 billion euros. The pace of



²⁴ <https://startblokriekerhaven.nl/en/>

²⁵ <http://www.housingeurope.eu/blog-514/housing-refugees-in-the-netherlands>

real estate purchasing by immigrants slowed down from 2008, due to the difficulty in accessing loans, but it still weights around the 8% of the total. In general, as many as 63.5% of immigrants rent, while only 21.5% of them are home owners. For the rest, 7.7% live at the workplace and 7.3% live at relatives or other fellows' citizens. A sign of an improvement in the purchasing power of immigrants is that in 2018 more buy homes in central urban areas (the share goes from 5.2% in 2011 to 8.2% in 2018) and in the semi-centre (from 5.4% in 2016 to 9.3% in 2018). Generally, the quality of the properties rented or purchased by immigrants is poor and almost never new builds. If we analyse the trends, we can find out that, especially in county towns, most immigrants that lives in rented houses tend to stay in close contact and company with their countrymen and they tend to settle in more "Italian" area as they stabilize in Italy.

As well as a basic condition of human dignity a home also represents a stake in a society. **For migrants to be integrated into a society at the most basic level they need a home.** From this they can go to work, take children to school, have an address to access credit ratings and utilities and start to engage in their societies. A home also offers the stability to invite people to share in their hospitality. Before the financial crash homes had begun to be treated as assets. This demands that the revenue from the tenant is reliable and so has allowed racialized zoning to occur, much as it did in the USA (Dymski 2009). While in some countries empty rural dwellings have found a new lease of life with immigrant populations (Kasimis et al 2010), in others there are likely to be exacerbated tensions around housing access.

VIII. Crime and migration

We have seen, even in the course of this short summary of social change and migration, how the definition of migrants varies from country to country and according to a wide range of technical and political criteria. The definition of a migrant is in many ways less the product of a person crossing a border as the administration of a wide range of policies relating to among other themes housing and healthcare (Eule et al 2018). As such migration policies stand a significant chance of failing if they do not recognise factors linked to social dynamics, globalization and politics (Castles 2004). As Europe responds to a large movement of people, notably since the 2015 refugee crisis but also due to climate change, Arab Spring and a wide range of other factors, the responses to border controls have been uncontrolled. With only a **superficial commitments set out in the Maastricht Treaty**, a “combination of low harmonization, weak monitoring, low solidarity and lack of strong institutions in EU migration policy became increasingly unsustainable during the 2015 crisis” (Scipioni 2018: 1365). **The lack of European leadership allowed member states to use criminal justice systems** (Gyollai & Amatrudo 2018, such as law enforcement agencies and prisons (Pakes & Holt 2017), to manage immigration with devastating effects on the experiences of migrants (Bhatia 2019). In common with the USA and UK (Massey 2020), countries across the EU have treated immigrants like criminals in a widely recognised practice called “**crimmigration**” (Campesi 2019; van der Woude 2017).

In many national debates the framing of migrants as criminals has been justified by reference to relatively **high levels of migrant populations in prisons**. As observed above with other migration data, such statistics obscure as much as they reveal, especially as they exonerate the influence of domestic and EU policies in the criminalization of migrants. Attempts to control labour through migration takes place as “the partial *de-bordering* of the western world under the impulse of economic and financial globalization has been complemented by a simultaneous process of *re-bordering* of western democracies against global migrations” (de Giorgi 2010: 151, citing Pickering and Weber, 2006). When imposed on the nativist language that followed the 9-11 attacks, the unplanned extension of criminal justice to manage migration and the redeployment of surveillance technologies to track criminals (Dekkers 2019), member state responses to the 2015 refugee crisis were pre-dispositioned to see migrants as a threat long before the Syrian conflict escalated out of control. In many countries it has been the administration of policies (eg accessing welfare) where the checks that determine migrant status have been policed. A couple of the country reports tackled these issues head on, exploring the efficacy of key events in criminalizing migrants, examining the data on prison populations with a keener eye and locating the debates over migration policy in a broader political context. The German report demonstrates how a press code has evolved to manage such misrepresentations. The Italian report analysed the statistical data in some detail to reveal a more nuanced explanation of high migrant populations in prisons.

Since 2016, a debate arose in Germany about the **connection between nationality and crime**. Young men with a migration background harassed women on Cologne New Year's Eve 2015/16 and there was a debate over whether this was due to the criminality of the migrants. Almost half of those without a migration background who were surveyed believed that refugees lead to increased levels of crime. People of Turkish descent and EU/RoW migrants living in Germany have similar attitudes. By contrast, more than two thirds of ethnic German resettlers expressed

this opinion “ (Summary of the Integration Barometer 2018 by the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration²⁶).

The question of **what role origin plays** has been considered in police crime statistics.²⁷ According to this, more than 30 percent of suspects are foreigners (if violations of the law on foreigners are deducted). This is significantly more than their share of the population (approx. twelve percent). The logical short circuit: foreigners are more criminal than Germans. However, the statistics do not include criminals who only stay temporarily in Germany, such as tourists or professional burglars. Or, that **crime is above all a phenomenon among young men**, a population group in which the proportion of foreigners is higher. However, the fact that there is a genetic or cultural tendency towards crime is scientifically untenable. It is more likely that a lack of integration capacity in the host society, social exclusion, bureaucratic hurdles, discrimination, a relatively **closed education system** and so on will lead to certain groups becoming more likely to commit crimes. The German Press Code recommends that in reporting criminal offences it should be ensured that "the mention of the suspects or perpetrators belonging to ethnic, religious or other minorities does not lead to a discriminatory generalisation of individual misconduct". The Code has been in existence since 1973 and has the character of a voluntary commitment.

While the press code is valid nationwide, the **police forces of the federal states regulate the naming of nationality differently**. Only Schleswig-Holstein enforces this. In Thuringia, there is no decree on the naming of nationalities in press releases, according to the State Ministry of the Interior. In press releases, the police in North Rhine-Westphalia are to name the nationality of all suspects in future - as long as this is beyond doubt.

Anti immigration rhetoric has often been based on **de-humanising immigrants** by, stereotyping them as having less morals or lower standards. In **Italy**, a popular stereotype asserts the **criminality of migrants** as the number of criminals and prisoners rise. But this is not true. In the last three decades, as the number of immigrants who regularly live in Italy has almost quadrupled, their detention rate has fallen drastically, by about three times. In **2003, 1.16% of immigrants regularly residing in Italy ended up in prison, today the percentage has dropped to 0.39%**. This figure is more striking if we consider that in addition to resident immigrants there are around 500 thousand irregularly present migrants too. If we combine these figures for the total number of immigrants in Italy, the percentage of non-Italian prisoners compared to the total of free immigrants falls further to 0.36%. The prison administration, in its statistical surveys, does not distinguish between non-EU prisoners legally resident in Italy and irregularly present non-EU citizens. An empirical analysis on a local basis shows that non-EU prisoners with a regular residence permit are less than one third of the total.

Second stereotype suggests that the **number of immigrant inmates are growing**. This is due to the **increasing use criminal processes and laws to process migrants** and the **presentation of migrants as dangerous** (Campesi & Fabini 2019). In Italy, the number of foreign prisoners has remained more or less stable in the last twelve months

²⁶ https://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SVR_Integration_Barometer_2018_Summary.pdf

²⁷ www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/KriminalitaetImKontextVonZuwanderung/kernaussagenZuKriminalitaetImKontextVonZuwanderungIQuartal2019.html?nn=62336

despite ethnic profiling and discrimination in the access to precautionary measures and alternative non-custodial measures.

Third stereotype: African citizens, under a group of foreign prisoners, are among the **most dangerous** and among the most prone to deviance. It's not true. A similar consideration was made for Romanians and Albanians. Only a fifth of the total number of foreign prisoners comes from sub-Saharan Africa. The citizens of black Africa, in absolute terms, are therefore not many in Italian prisons and **commit less serious offenses**, even if they come from tragic places of war or hunger. The most represented nationality in Italian prisons is the Moroccan one with 3,808 detainees on 31 March 2019, a number almost corresponding to the total number of prisoners from black Africa. These stereotypes could be the effect of two factors: misinformation and the **visibility of most of the crimes** that are perpetrated by immigrants (drugs, burglary) that rises in the population the feeling to be at risk.

According to the Italian Ministry of Interior 2017 data, about one third of the crimes are perpetrated by immigrants (30,4% of the total crimes in 2017) but this is decreasing constantly and has halved in the decade between 2006 to 2016. The long-term tendency to reduce the crime rate of immigrants seems to be linked to the permanence of immigrants in Italy and ultimately to their level of integration. There is a very strong dissociation between the **permanence of residential status and criminal status**. Out of the total number of non-EU citizens reported for the various crimes, those without a residence permit were responsible for almost 70% of the assaults, 75% for murders, 85% for thefts and robberies. In other words, it is not the ethnicity, nor the origin, nor the cultural background that defines the problem. Rather it is the impossibility of getting a job, a home, or income support as an irregular resident that is the problem.

Another factor that facilitate crimes is recidivism and the biggest factor of **recidivism** of a crime is the prison. In fact, the data show that the recurrence rate is 68.4% among those who have served a sentence in prison and only 19% among those who have served an alternative sentence. If anything, the problem is that immigrants, especially for short-term sentences, those up to five years in prison, end up in prison much more than Italians. The relationship is reversed, for penalties from five years upwards, where the number of Italian prisoners exceeds that of immigrants.

The 1975 law that rules the Italian prison system has been modified many times in response to contingencies and to real or and imagined emergencies. The law is based on the concept of **penitentiary treatment aiming at re-education**. Therefore, a “scientific observation of the personality” of each prisoner is conducted to identify the best individual path to reintegrate the detainee into society. The punishment given by sentences is “flexible” and can be reduced if the prisoner behaves according to prison and treatment rules. Prison is a world of its own where the different exigencies of security and re-education must live together in an often-difficult balance. The personnel reflect these two sides: social workers and psychologists live and work together with the guards to assure that treatment and security are always taken into consideration during the staying of the person. In the same way, the criminal and penitentiary statistics, as well as demographic surveys, used to guide decisions concerning social, cultural and criminal phenomena need to be used to challenge the stereotypes and prejudices concerning migrant criminality.

Crimmigration is the product of free market policies, technological change and a populist post 9-11 political agenda to turn migrants into criminals and to present refugees as a threat. **The data does not stack up but what is needed is more rigorous examination of facts** and assertions, more effort to interpret data trends critically and a more effective media presence to challenge lazy stereo types. There is a case for better data but this also requires securing more data from migrants who may already be vulnerable. A better response is to reveal the paranoia behind these claims and to demonstrate how these contribute to “impoverished” interpretations of data.

IX. Migration and social reproduction

As noted above the Netherlands received a large number of refugees during the 2015 refugee crisis. Nearly 22,000 people also received a residence permit in the Netherlands for family reunification, the largest groups being Indians and Turks, with about 2,000 permits each. Some 13,845 people arrived for family reunification with asylum seekers. While prior to 2004, family channels had been the primary source of immigration, the number dropped following implementation of stricter rules. However, since 2007 family-based immigration has increased from Eastern Europe and top origin countries of labour migrants and asylum seekers. In **2018 the number of people arriving for family reunification with asylum seekers dropped for the first time in several years to 6,465.**

Over the last decade, **labour migration to the Netherlands overtook family reunification** as the main pathway for newcomers. Almost 80 percent of labour migrants were EU nationals, while 10 percent were Asian. Foreign student enrolment increased significantly, primarily from Germany and then China. The total number of students rose from 28,000 in academic year 2004/2005 to 112,000, from 163 different countries in 2016/2017. The 2017 governing coalition agreement recognized the need to bring in highly skilled workers, to maintain the Netherlands' innovation and creative edge. This strongly implies that this flow will be limited and targeted only at the most qualified to replenish the labour market.

The issue of **naturalization, and dual citizenship** in particular, has emerged as a sticking point in Dutch debates. Dual nationality has generally not been permitted, unless as a person is born with Dutch and another citizenship. The Netherlands practices both *jus sanguinis* (Citizenship from parents) and a limited form of *jus solis* (double, whereby citizenship is acquired by children born in the Netherlands to parents who were also born in the Netherlands, even if the parents do not have Dutch citizenship themselves). Dutch nationals who take on another citizenship generally have to give up their Dutch passport; most of those who become Dutch through naturalization must surrender their other nationality.

Dual nationality has become a thorny question, in part because there are some countries, where it is forbidden to renounce citizenship. Politicians on the far right consider 'citizenship' to be synonymous with 'loyalty', as was revealed to a ministerial post in the 2017 cabinet. A major element in the origin of this discussion is the fact that the countries in question are often Muslim countries. However, another case has arisen to consider dual nationality positively, namely Brexit. Both Dutch citizens currently in the UK and British citizens in the Netherlands would benefit from the possibility to naturalize before the UK leaves the EU. Largely motivated by Wilder's (Party leader far right party (PVV)) rhetoric and reactions to it, the default approach of the earlier government (2012-2017) led by Rutte was to oppose dual nationality. The Rutte-led coalition government formed in 2017 signaled its readiness to consider modernizing the nationality law, especially in light of Brexit. It proposed changes including greater generosity in accepting multiple nationalities for first-generation immigrants and emigrants. Since 2015, about 28,000 immigrant per year became Dutch citizens, a decrease from the roughly

One Dutch minister is a dual Dutch-Swedish national (Kajsa Ollongren), the Speaker of Parliament also has Moroccan nationality (Khadija Arib).

33,000 naturalizations in 2014. It is likely that some of these people became dual citizens, maintain their original nationality. In addition, an unknown number of children were born to at least one Dutch parent outside the Netherlands, and automatically became Dutch citizen. As such, this issue impacts many among the approximately 1 million Dutch nationals around the world, who might have spouses and children of multiple nationalities.

Migrant children have been the focus of significant policy developments and concerns for several years with a media focus on regulations for children resident for five years or more without documentation and the role of religious, mostly Islamic, schools in society. In 2012 the VVD-PvdA (Rutte's party/Labor Party) coalition government established a Children's Amnesty (Kinder Pardon) regulation, in essence amnesty for children who had lives without legal status in the Netherlands for five or more years. The reasoning behind this was that children who had been in school in the Netherlands and spoke Dutch while their parents sought asylum (unsuccessfully) would generally find it difficult to adapt or acculturate to society if returned to their country of origin. Despite this very few achieved legal status, as a 2017 report by the Children's Ombudsman detailed.

It was the situation of an Armenia brother and sister that eventually drew public attention and led a new agreement. Lili and Howick were set to be deported to Armenia after 11 years in the Netherlands, where their asylum claims had been rejected. Their mother had previously been deported, but according to experts she was not of sufficient mental health to be able to care for the children, who would be going to a country they did not know, with a language they did not understand, and into a deprived socioeconomic situation. After several dramatic turns with the children running away and going into hiding to avoid imminent deportation, all closely followed and reported by the mainstream media, they were granted legally status. As a result of this case a new **Children's Amnesty regulation** was determined through broad political compromise. However, demonstrating the focus on numbers and intense difficulties in the immigration debate in the Netherlands, as part of this compromise, the resettlement program was dialed back from 750 places to 500 in February 2019.

Another touchpoint in the ongoing integration debate is the role of **Islamic schools**, both those offering regular, full-time education and weekend schools teaching culture and language. An Islamic foundation in Amsterdam opened a secondary school in 2017, after a fraught permitting process, but in accordance with Dutch freedom of education laws and receiving Amsterdam City Council subsidies. In 2019 the national coordinator for security and counterterrorism warned the City Council that pupils at the school were being influenced by the teachers who are in contact with terrorist, causing subsidies to be frozen. Weekend schools have also raised concern. Media reports in 2018 suggest Syrian parents had established a dozen weekend schools, **teaching their children the language and culture of their homeland**. There is some fear that these schools are also teaching religion in such way as to influence these children toward potential terrorism. At the very least such schools are seen to hamper the integration of the children into the Dutch society. There are however, no similar concerns for the thousands of Dutch weekend schools worldwide, which teach the language and culture to children either of families who will/might return to the Netherlands or who have Dutch heritage. As many Syrian families have only temporary residence permit, it is not clear that long-term integration is something for which they can plan. Meanwhile, the Turkish government is subsidizing 12 Turkish weekend schools in the Netherlands, which, as weekend schools, are generally not under Dutch government supervision. However, with the involvement of foreign government

support, there are calls for a different approach to ensure these schools are meeting Dutch standards and in particular that they do nothing to discourage or prevent integration.

Many of the schools in question are in **major cities**, and cities find themselves on the frontline of the implementation of integration plans. Communities and municipal councils are responsible for the day-to-day work of providing integration courses and housing for asylum seekers and refugees, among other activities directed at newcomers. At the local level, the impact of anti-immigrant policies and the pressure to integrate without genuine support is seen and felt by people who are in daily contact with immigrant and see the difficulties they face. While tensions have arisen in some communities, with people living near reception centers sometimes expressing frustration about their fears for public safety, municipal leaders have promoted mutual understanding and a duty to help protect people who escaped persecution and violence and give them a new home.

In Italy, a 2019 IDOS report identified that 51.7% of total immigrant residents in Italy were women (2.718.716 women; +46.716 from 2018). In absolute terms the first five nationalities are Romanians, Albanians, Moroccans, Ukrainians and Chinese. In particular, the communities of Ukrainians, Polish and Moldavians have the highest presence of women (more than 70%) who are involved in the market of domestic and family care.

Immigrant resident women per nationality (2018)					
Country	n.	% on total of immigrant resident	Country	n.	% on total of immigrant resident
1) Romanian	693.649	57.5	6) Philippines	95.346	56.7
2) Albanian	215.711	48.9	7) Moldova	85.431	66.2
3) Morocco	197.675	46.7	8) Poland	69.560	73.8
4) Ukraine	185.858	77.6	9) India	65.561	41.5
5) China	149.034	49.7	10) Peru	40.834	58.0
Figure 6 Source: 2019, Dossier Statistico sull'immigrazione, Centro Studi e Ricerche Idos					

In 2018 there were 102.892 entries of immigrant women arrived especially from Morocco, Albanian, Nigeria, China and Ukrainian. These women were mainly under 18 years old and came in Italy to reunify their families. The exception were from Nigeria seeking asylum. 65% of these women arrived as single ("nubile") which was an increase on previous years, possibly as the route they took did not allow them to travel as a couple or family.

The situation of immigrant women in the Italian labour market deserves attention. In 2018 the employment rate of immigrant women is 50.2%, 17.6% less than immigrant men, but one point plus than Italian women. The percentage of immigrant women between the ages of 15 and 29 who were NEET (not in employment education or training) was about 39.8%. Again this was higher than for migrant men, but lower than NEET Italian women (about 44%).

However, the condition of immigrant female workers is mostly unqualified, precarious and low-paid even if the most part of immigrant women have higher qualification than immigrant men. In addition, sectoral and occupational segregation by gender is not diminishing, but rising. In Italy 76% of caregivers and the 65% of housekeepers are migrant women. They are mostly involved in domestic and family care sector work and have few opportunities to change their situation. For these jobs, the borderline between the formal and the informal economy is a fine one. It estimates that in Italy, out of 2 million households employed overall, 1.2 million are invisible, without rights.

Societies need to be reproduced if economies are to be sustained. New growth demands new consumers and workers to create the services and products that feed it. This observation highlights the gendered division of labour in reproductive and domestic care (Bakker & Gill 2019). The global nature of European economies reflect this and as the global economy separates firms from the welfare of the societies where they trade a global dimension to social reproduction emerges as the gap are bridged by female migrant labour (Katz 2001). The **gendered nature of migration is therefore undeniable** as women carry reproductive obligations and roles across boundaries and into new societies. In addition intensely personal relationships that bind families also come under duress in the migration process as family reunification follows initial refugee movements. The process of migration is therefore not an automatic one based on economic calculation alone. Rather it reflects and reaffirms power imbalances in the home through cultural and social expectations in both host and home country. These tensions are hidden in the roles that women play as carers of children and older people, domestic workers and home makers. But they are also evident in social institutions as they adapt to the needs of migrant and changing host societies.

X. Summary and recommendations

1. The country studies indicate a wide range of definitions, practices and understandings of migration across Europe. Migration and integration describe an ongoing process in societies as they change. While there may be common phenomena driving the changes, the marked differences in country migration patterns, migrant origin countries and issues relating to migrant integration show that host countries do not react to migrants in isolation. Rather the process of migrant integration is one informed by the past, the power relations and, often colonial, hierarchies these cemented, and the traditions these have laid down in host societies. Debates about migration are therefore as much about changes and challenges in European societies - like an ageing society, climate change, slowed economic growth - as they are about the people who enter a country as migrants. Will they be open or closed, welcoming or hostile? Migration, and the benefits it can offer to Europe's societies, needs to take far more central place in Europe's key political debates and institutions.
2. There is a real need to promote better discussions and understandings of both sides of the experiences of migration and of receiving migrants to better understand mutual fears, hopes and frustrations as well as formulate collective actions and identities. Political institutions have the capacity to do this but presently the focus of many migration institutions seems to be to keep migrants and society apart rather than bring them together. These institutionalised borders need to be examined, unpacked and evaluated more stringently – are they worth the money, do they create more problems than they solve, are they fit for purpose in a world facing so many new challenges that can only be addressed collectively? If migrants are to be integrated into society, they need to be far more integrated into societies institutions.
3. How can the experience of migrants be better represented at different levels of social interaction? It is clear that local political responses to migrants can be very different to national ones, either more welcoming through making human connections or more opposed in competition for scarce resources. But the institutionalisation of policies frequently prohibits better representation of migrant voices and views to the detriment of effective understanding and debate. At one level greater migration levels will require a mechanism for a greater voice, especially if paying taxes does not guarantee them access to welfare or other forms of rights. At another level the ideologies and traditions of European politics are unlikely to effectively capture perspectives from different cultures and societies. Europe needs to consider how it translates its post national democratic form beyond its own borders.
4. Many of the inequalities that migrants face are experienced by Europeans too. Class, gender, access to housing and jobs, welfare and healthcare, are all challenges under the EU's existing systems. If there was an abundance of resources in these areas then perhaps there would be more generosity. Blaming migrants has always been used as a strategy for distracting the blame from those who deserve it. Policies that claim to protect welfare spending are easily received by racists, just like a dog's whistle is only heard by a dog. There is therefore no point in not pursuing more rights for migrants and better conditions for refugees as many who object to offering basic rights to migrants are already committed to not welcoming them.

5. A recurrent theme in this discussion of societal integration has been the lack of formal representation of migrants in the society that they live in. Migrants, past present and future, from all over the world and the EU are an important constituency of Europe. They bring resourcefulness, awareness and diversity that enriches the EU and its member states. They also generate taxable income and provide valuable contributions to society across the full range of human endeavor. Yet have no political voice explicitly dedicated to their representation. European Parliamentary Groupings reflect long standing political traditions (liberal, social and Christian democracy) that may support migrants but have their origins in European political life and concerns. There is unlikely to be a consistent position that reflects all migrant demands and wishes but, like other interests in the EESC or minorities in the EP, they deserve to be heard. But with no political voice advocating the benefits of migrants for countries, nationalist anti migrant voices are likely to prevail. An international party that represented the voices of the wide range of migrants could and should make it home in the EU and be the voice of those who are stateless or across states through choice or necessity.

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